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“The practice of interlocking directorates is the root of many evils.”2

See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS
USE IT 70 (1914).
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Introduction
The nonprofit3 sector and matters of nonprofit governance have
been in the national spotlight much of late.4 One area of heightened
interest is directors of healthcare entities regularly serving on the board
of more than one healthcare organization. Even when board membership
of related entities is relatively independent, one corporation’s business
plan frequently is affected by (or even controlled by) the business needs
of a separately incorporated parent, affiliate, or other related
organization. Very little caselaw addresses “interlocking” directorates
for nonprofit board members, and the caselaw that does exist tends to
2
BRANDEIS, supra note *, at 51. The context for this comment relates to the
cronyism in bank boards of trustees that was endemic to the banking industry in the early
1900s. Brandeis wrote a series of articles that appeared in Harper’s Weekly opposing the
state of interlocking boards in banking because they facilitated a “money monopoly” that
concentrated power in the hands of a few wealthy and powerful men. See id. at 1,
quoting Governor Woodrow Wilson (before he became President Wilson). Brandeis later
states that the “nexus between all the large potentially competing corporations must be
severed if the Money Trust is to be broken.” Id. at 78. The power in healthcare is not
nearly as concentrated in boards of directors as it once was in the banking industry, but
the warning reminds us to question the status quo.
3
A nonprofit corporation can be better described as not profit-sharing. The
corporation can earn a profit, but any profit must be used to carry out the mission of the
corporation and cannot inure to the benefit of individuals who work for the organization
or to other private parties. The rules are dictated by the state in which the corporation is
incorporated. Being a nonprofit corporation must be distinguished from having taxexempt status, which is a federal status granted by the Internal Revenue Service that
allows the corporation to avoid certain federal taxes so long as it meets certain
requirements. While the two are related, they are fundamentally different legal issues
that are often combined and/or confused. See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Developments in
the Law: Nonprofit Corporations, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1578, 1581-83 (1992) (describing
the nature of the nonprofit corporate form).
4
See, e.g., PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY
GOVERNANCE ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS: A FINAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS AND THE NONPROFIT SECTOR (2005) (hereinafter “FINAL REPORT”), available
at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/final/Panel_Final_Report.pdf. This project, sponsored
by Independent Sector (a private coalition of nonprofit organizations that studies the
nonprofit sector) and presented to the Senate Finance Committee at its request, provides
an example of the focus on the charitable sector. The Panel submitted a report of more
than one hundred pages to the Senate Finance Committee enumerating the ways in which
the nonprofit sector (an incredibly large number of corporations and corporate missions
are included in this thought) is invaluable to the United States, how the sector can
improve itself, and what government can do (or should refrain from doing) to improve
transparency, governance, and accountability (as the title suggests). See id. As an
example of the focus on governance, the Panel recommends:
As a matter of recommended practice, charitable organizations should adopt
and enforce a conflict of interest policy consistent with its state laws and
organizational needs. The IRS should require every charitable organization to
disclose on its Form 990 series return whether it has such a policy. Charitable
organizations should also adopt policies and procedures that encourage and
protect individuals who come forward with credible information on illegal
practices or violations of adopted policies of the organization. There should be
a vigorous sectorwide effort to educate and encourage all charitable
organizations, regardless of size, to adopt and enforce policies and procedures
to address possible conflicts of interest and to facilitate reporting of suspected
malfeasance and misconduct by organization managers.
Id. at 8.
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address narrow, fact-based, state law interpretive issues rather than
elucidating the nature and scope of fiduciary duties – leaving the doctrine
in this area severely underdeveloped.5 Guidance from state statutes and
supplementary guidance documents such as the Revised Model
Nonprofit Corporation Act is minimal as well. Within this vacuum,
considerable tension exists between the modern reality of overlapping
boards, which often occur due to integration of healthcare entities into
“delivery systems,” and the traditional doctrine of fiduciary duties, which
contemplates that directors will serve only one corporation.6
It is a long-standing principle of corporate law that directors owe
fiduciary duties to the corporation(s) on whose boards they sit.7
Nonprofit directors’ fiduciary duties are threefold: the duty of care, the
duty of loyalty, and the duty of obedience.8 The duty of care requires
directors to act in an informed, careful manner in their decision-making.9
The duty of loyalty commands directors to act without self-interest, in
good faith, and in the best interests of the corporation at all times.10 The
5

See, e.g., Health Maintenance Network of Southern California v. Blue Cross
of Southern California, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1043 (1988) (discussing certain bylaw
amendments that were contrary to California law and inconsistent with principles of
corporate independence for a subsidiary); Health America Pennsylvania, Inc. v.
Susquehanna Health System, 278 F. Supp. 2d 423 (2003) (reviewing the mergers that
created an integrated delivery system and determining that they did not violate the antitrust principles of the Clayton Act); Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat [MEETH] v. Eliot
Spitzer, 186 Misc.2d 126 (1999) (denying a petition to sell a historic nonprofit hospital
for failure to prove that the transaction was fair and reasonable); Richmond County
Hospital Authority v. Richmond County, 336 S.E.2d 562 (1985) (examining the actions
of a public authority in running a hospital and selling some of its assets); see also John K.
Wells, Multiple Directorships: The Fiduciary Duties and Conflicts of Interest That Arise
When One Individual Serves More Than One Corporation, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 561,
563 (2000) (lamenting that courts have given very little guidance on the duties of
directors of for-profit, general corporations that serve multiple boards).
6
See Melissa Middleton, Nonprofit Boards of Directors: Beyond the
Governance Function, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 141, 141 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987),
noting, “Only a meager amount of literature is available to help frustrated board members
and managers.” Id. at 141.
7
See Koehler v. Black River Falls Iron Co., 67 U.S. 715, 720-21 (1862).
Justice Davis stated the fiduciary principle thus:
Instead of honestly endeavoring to effect a loan of money, advantageously, for
the benefit of the corporation, these directors, in violation of their duty, and in
betrayal of their trust, secured their own debts, to the injury of the stockholders
.... Directors cannot thus deal with the important interests entrusted to their
management. They hold a place of trust, and by accepting the trust are obliged
to execute it with fidelity, nor for their own benefit, but for the common benefit
of the stockholders of the corporation.
Id.
8
See James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV.
218, 229-30 (2003). For-profit directors must only adhere to the duty of care and the
duty of loyalty; the duty of obedience is applied only to nonprofit corporations. Query
whether the duty of obedience should apply to for-profit healthcare entities, which still
must abide by rules of licensure and statutory mission; perhaps that is a question for
another paper.
9
See ALICE G. GOSFIELD, MICHAEL F. ANTHONY, JOEL L. MICHAELS & RONALD
N. SUTTER, HEALTH LAW PRACTICE GUIDE Vol. 1 at 6-63 – 6-64 (2003) (citing N.Y. Notfor-Profit Corp. Law § 720-a).
10
See Jill R. Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector: The Behavior,
Law, and Ethics of Not-For-Profit Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1345 (2003) (describing
fiduciary duties from a state law perspective).
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duty of obedience obliges directors to ensure that the charitable mission
of the corporation is carried out and to obey laws relevant to the
organization.11 While the duty of care and the duty of loyalty are wellestablished, the duty of obedience is a more recent development and not
fully incorporated into the canon of nonprofit fiduciary duties.12
Three examples will help to illustrate the strains and conflicts
that are endemic in modern nonprofit governance. The first relates to
integration of the finance and service aspects of healthcare and the
conflicts that may be predestined to arise in healthcare systems that have
integrated these functions (known as vertically integrated delivery
systems). The break-up of Allina Health System by the Minnesota
Attorney General serves as a parable, as it illuminates the critical issue of
whether the duty of loyalty and the duty of obedience can be honored
while serving more than one board of directors when the corporations are
related but have conflicting licensure mandates. The second example
hypothesizes an urban-suburban hospital system and the typical conflicts
of interest that arise when multiple healthcare entities that provide
essentially the same services join forces by contract and by agreeing to
be governed by one umbrella board of directors or by boards of directors
with overlapping members (called ‘horizontal’ integration). The third
example is a smaller, community-based hospital and home health agency
that share board members; this model exists in many communities across
the country and highlights the idea that even when integration has not
occurred, business plans can affect close entities. Each of the three
examples raises questions about overlapping directors’ duties,
particularly the duties of loyalty and obedience.
The current reality of the healthcare industry and corporations in
general is that directors sit on multiple boards.13 Some would argue (as
did, in another context, Justice Brandeis) that this practice should be
halted entirely because it is nothing but a grab at power and control by
individuals attempting to avoid certain constraints of the corporate form.
While the argument has merit, this article will focus on the extant
11
See MICHAEL W. PEREGRINE & JAMES R. SCHWARTZ, THE APPLICATION OF
NONPROFIT CORPORATION LAW TO HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS 40-41 (2002) (citing
DANIEL KURTZ, BOARD LIABILITY: GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS (Moyer Bell Ltd.
1988)).
12
To wit, the American Law Institute has been in the process of creating
Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations, and the draft document does not
separately delineate the duty of obedience; instead, it discusses the director’s duty to
adhere to laws applicable to the organization as a part of the duty of care. See A.L.I.
PRELIMINARY DRAFT #3 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, § 305
Comments on Subsection (b), 67 (2005) (on file with author). The draft document
recognizes that the organic documents of the nonprofit may help guide directors, but the
drafters deliberately did not separate the duty of obedience doctrinally. See id. at 70.
The ALI drafters appear concerned with the influence of trust law and the restrictions of
cy pres-type doctrine. See id. at 32. Given the restrictions that are imposed on healthcare
entities due to the licensure aspect of their organizational mission, the flexibility
envisioned by the A.L.I. drafters could not exist for healthcare entities. Further,
adherence to the duty of obedience might aid directors in their quest to serve multiple
organizations well and fairly.
13
The authors of the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act acknowledge
this in the commentary. See Rev Model Nonprofit Corp. Act § 8.31 commentary (1987)
(recognizing that board members are often chosen for their ability to make connections
for an entity) [hereinafter RMNCA].
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problem, as the complete cessation of such interlocking boards does not
appear to be immediately attainable. Board members are entitled to more
certain guidance, and the communities they serve are entitled to socially
responsible nonprofit institutions.14 Therefore, the time is ripe to modify
the doctrine of fiduciary duties so that it encompasses this reality of
overlapping boards; recognizes the trend toward more global,
comprehensive, and proactive governance in the healthcare sector; and
enables directors to decipher, document, and resolve conflicts at a more
meaningful point in their decision-making processes. If we want highlevel stewardship to steer board members faced with conflicts, then we
must provide a substantive doctrine that guides and that can be employed
easily by the largest and smallest, most and least sophisticated
institutions.15
This article will first discuss the three examples of overlap in
nonprofit boards of directors to create a frame of reference for analyzing
this feature of nonprofit boards. Next, the article will describe and
analyze the deficiencies in the doctrine of fiduciary duties as they are
traditionally defined, why fiduciary duties must better guide directors in
serving multiple boards, and how the duty of obedience can become
doctrinally more potent by bifurcating the defined and guiding mission of
the organization into what I have dubbed “charter mission” (meaning the
nonprofit corporate mission as suggested by the state’s nonprofit act) and
“licensure mission” (meaning the healthcare mission as dictated by state
licensure statutes and regulations). The article will then briefly address
the reasons why the usual approach to conflicts by for-profit corporations
– inform and recuse – is insufficient for healthcare nonprofits. Finally,
the article will set forth a proposal that includes the procedural and
substantive modifications necessary to catalyze a shift in understanding
and to achieve the level of guidance that directors and their organizations
so clearly need.

14

See FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 21, stating, “Public trust is essential to a
viable nonprofit sector.”
15
Also, boards must be able to decipher and solve conflicts of interest before
getting so embroiled in resulting problems that attorneys general intervene, as they have
been doing with more regularity lately. See Thomas L. Greaney & Kathleen M.
Boozang, Mission, Margin, and Trust in the Nonprofit Healthcare Enterprise, 5 Yale J.
Health Law & Policy 1, 2-3 (2004) (discussing the overreaching of state attorneys general
in recent efforts at controlling the activities of nonprofits and the reasons that such
“activism” is inappropriate); see also Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org: Why SarbanesOxley Will Not Ensure Comprehensive Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
205, 206-07 (2004) (noting that “activist state AGs” have become more active in
overseeing the activities of nonprofits, going so far as to propose financial accountability
legislation that mirrors Sarbanes-Oxley); Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism
and Paternalism in State Charity Law Enforcement, 79 INDIANA L.J. 937, 940-41 (2004)
(describing the rise in state attorney general activity in the nonprofit sector as a rise in
“parochialism and paternalism”); Michael W. Peregrine & James R. Schwartz, Key
Nonprofit Corporate Law Developments in 2002, 12 HEALTH L. REP. 324, 328 (2003)
(suggesting that, in order to diffuse attorney general attention to parent/subsidiary
fiduciary conflicts, counsel to healthcare organizations with such structures should draft
affiliation agreements that anticipate potential conflicts of interest and where loyalties lie
in the event that conflicts arise).
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I. Understanding Board Overlap
Historically the overlap in nonprofits’ boards of directors has not
been accidental, nor has it been a necessarily bad thing. In fact, the
creation of connections for business purposes and for development of
resources has been important for all nonprofits, not just those within the
healthcare industry.16 This was particularly true when nonprofits were
generally small businesses that relied on volunteer community leaders to
complete their boards of directors, who in turn created opportunities and
obtained benefits for their nonprofits.17 Healthcare has become an
industry of large, sophisticated, and interconnected businesses, and
boards of directors continue to overlap between healthcare entities. This
occurs for a variety of reasons, ranging from the economic sensibilities
of alignment (as with vertically integrated delivery systems) to the
business strategy of connecting entities to capture markets (as with
horizontally integrated healthcare systems).18 In smaller communities,
the reasons for board overlap appear not to have changed over time;
small communities still rely on limited pools of volunteers.
Each of the three examples discussed below involves affiliation
and/or integration of healthcare entities, which has become customary in
the industry during the past twenty or so years.19 Horizontal integration
indicates the merger or alignment of several entities within the same
market that provide essentially the same types of services in order to
capture the market and to encourage efficiencies.20 More specifically, in
a horizontally integrated system, a number of hospitals in varied
locations with different specialties might affiliate in order to consolidate
resources and thus create greater efficiencies through economies of scale
and through creation of centers of excellence.21 The trend of health
system integration was first experienced as horizontal integration of
healthcare entities and then moved toward vertical integration.22 In the
16

See Peter Dobkin Hall, A Historical Overview of the Private Nonprofit
Sector, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 3, 14 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987) (describing
nonprofit development in the United States and providing historic examples of board
overlap in nonprofit organizations, such as Walter S. Gifford serving on the boards of the
Rockefeller Foundation and the National Research Fund).
17
See Middleton, supra note 6, at 143 (commenting that nonprofit board
members tend to create inter-organizational ‘linkages’ by having board members who are
affiliated with a number of community groups).
18
See Thomas L. Greaney, Managed Care Competition, Integrated Delivery
Systems and Antitrust, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 1507, 1516 (1994) (describing the ways in
which integrated delivery systems promote efficiency in the context of managed care
contracting).
19
See Dana Brakman Reiser, Decision-Makers Without Duties: Defining the
Duties of Parent Corporations Acting as Sole Corporate Members in Nonprofit Health
Care Systems, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 979, 985-86 (2001) (describing the trend of
consolidation and affiliation in the healthcare industry).
20
See id. at 4-5, 7; see also Michelle M. Mello, Carly N. Kelly & Troyen A.
Brennan, Fostering Rational Regulation of Patient Safety, 30 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L.
375, 415 (2005) (noting that insurers have successfully worked with integrated delivery
systems to create monetary incentives to improve quality of care).
21
See id. at 8.
22
See Douglas A. Conrad & Stephen M. Shortell, Integrated Health Systems:
Promise and Performance, in INTEGRATED DELIVERY SYSTEMS: CREATION,
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healthcare context, vertical integration refers generally to the
combination of finance and service that theoretically increases economic
efficiencies by reducing risk for the payor and by increasing revenue
through aligning the interests of healthcare finance and healthcare
provider.23 Thus, a home health agency, long term care facility, hospital,
ambulatory care facility, and managed care organization might affiliate
to create a unified organism of care in a vertically integrated system.24
The key feature, though, is the alignment of finance and service.
Other industries generally effectuate vertical and horizontal
alignment by merger; in the healthcare industry, however, the
possibilities of integration often are limited to creating alignment of
interests and mechanisms of control by two methods -- contract and
governance. The parties to the integration will enforce the alignment by
drafting contracts requiring certain behaviors and by oversight of one
another’s enterprises via overlapping board membership and/or creation
of parent-subsidiary corporate family trees.25 Healthcare entities that
would choose to merge, believing it to be a benefit to both parties, are
frequently precluded from doing so directly and are required to maintain
separate incorporation for any number of the following reasons:
licensure; accreditation; Medicare provider status; asset protection
(which is key in a business that frequently experiences tort liability);
Medicare and Medicaid rules regarding fraud and abuse; and
preservation of tax-exemption if some business activities are considered
taxable. So, for example, a hospital is licensed to be a hospital in each
state in which the hospital provides services, and an HMO is licensed to
be an HMO in each state in which the HMO assumes the risk of
healthcare finance. 26 The two cannot generally merge without running
afoul of state department of health licensure proscriptions, resulting in
inefficient business practices as each branch of the business seeks to
comply with the regulatory requirements of the other; putting at risk the
statutorily required insurance reserves of the managed care entity in the
MANAGEMENT, AND GOVERNANCE 4 (1998) (explaining the trend during the 1970s and
80s toward horizontal integration and the subsequent movement toward vertically (or
“virtually”) integrated healthcare systems).
23
See id. at 5. Vertical integration in healthcare has also been referred to as
“diversification” indicating the intent to control the “delivery of a continuum of health
services to defined populations.” Id.
24
See id. at 9.
25
See Greaney & Boozang, supra note 15, at 23 (noting the general structure of
integrated delivery systems in the context of describing Allina and its fight with the
Minnesota attorney general); see also Greaney, supra note 18, at 1517-18 (describing
degrees of integration in the context of the constantly shifting healthcare markets of the
early 1990s).
26
Staff-model HMOs are an exception; however, but for Kaiser Permanente,
they appear to have failed as an experiment. For a new take on Kaiser Permanente, see
Steve Lohr, Is Kaiser the Future of American Health Care?, N.Y. TIMES, October 31,
2004, Business, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/31/business/yourmoney/.
The article asserts that the Kaiser Permanente version of staff-model HMOs is the wave
of the future in healthcare because Kaiser manages care, not just costs, as other staffmodel HMOs do. A policy expert at the World Health Organization, Neelam Sekhri, was
quoted thus: “What works at Kaiser is the integration of the financing and delivery of
care, and the aligned incentives that allow you to make more rational decisions about
health care for members.” Id. Other staff-model HMOs appear to have failed because
they manage only cost, not care.
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event of a successful malpractice recovery; and risking the tax-exempt
status of the hospital because of the (usually) taxable status of the
managed care entity.
Healthcare entities have responded by creating integrated
systems wherein the component parts are separately incorporated,
intending that each component operates to the benefit of the whole, and
with a single corporate parent orchestrating the unified operation.27 One
of the critical tools used by these systems to accomplish the goal of a
“unified whole” is overlapping directorates, and integration generally
results in an “interorganizational alliance.”28 The existence of multiple
separate entities working together but separately incorporated creates
conflicts that are highly likely to recur, as tension is never relieved by a
true organizational merger.29 And so, three examples follow to
demonstrate different aspects of the difficulty with the current standards
for fiduciary duties as applied to overlapping boards of nonprofit
healthcare organizations. The first example is Allina; the second is a
horizontally integrated hospital system; and the third is a local and
informally integrated healthcare system.
A. The Story of Allina Health System
The tale of Allina Health System (Allina) is instructive because
its story illustrates the difficulties of vertical integration from corporate,
financial, and licensure perspectives. Allina also demonstrates trends in
integration, as Allina was initially a horizontally integrated system
consisting of separately incorporated hospitals, clinics, outpatient
facilities, and other such direct patient care facilities named HealthSpan
Health System (HealthSpan). HealthSpan integrated with Medica Health
Plans (Medica), a nonprofit, separately incorporated health maintenance
organization (HMO).30 HealthSpan and Medica combined as separately
incorporated “divisions” of an unincorporated vertically integrated

27

In the past this model has been described by some as a ‘foundation model’
integrated delivery system, but the reality is the old adage if you’ve seen one, you’ve
seen one. For a brief description of foundation model systems, see Greaney, supra note
18, at 1519-20.
28
See Conrad & Shortell, supra note 22, at 7.
29
See Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care, issued jointly
by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice (August 1996),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/hlth3s.htm. Since the Policy Statements, very
little guidance has been issued by the FTC or the DOJ on integration for healthcare
entities. See Robert F. Leibenluft & Tracy E. Weir, Clinical Integration: Assessing the
Antitrust Issues, in HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 1, 3-5 (Alice G. Gosfield, ed. 2004).
30
Allina Health System was a complex organism consisting of “19 hospitals,
48 medical clinics, one HMO, two insurance companies, a preferred provider
organization, a third party administrator, a home health care service, a transportation
service, an equipment company, nursing homes, three foundations, printing companies,
and a web service entity.” OFFICE OF MINNESOTA ATTORNEY GENERAL MIKE HATCH,
COMPLIANCE REVIEW: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, § 2.1 at 1 (2001) (on file with author)
(hereinafter “COMPLIANCE REVIEW”). Medica was a fully functioning and profitable solo
HMO before the merger that formed the Allina health system in 1994, and it was the
second largest HMO in Minnesota, covering approximately 580,000 enrollees. Id. at §§
1.1, 3-4, 8.
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healthcare delivery system that became Allina.31 Paradoxically, the
Allina union resulted from Minnesota legislation that called for the
formation of “integrated service networks” (“ISNs”), which were
essentially vertically integrated delivery systems.32
Once concatenated, Medica generated approximately fifty
percent of all revenue for the Allina Health System, despite its
31

See COMPLIANCE REVIEW, § 1.11 (noting that the fundamental goal of a
merger between Allina and Medica that occurred in 1994 was to create an IDS). Allina
Health System was a tax-exempt charitable organization under Section 501(c)(3), but
Medica was a tax-exempt social-welfare organization under Section 501(c)(4) of the
Internal Revenue Code. See id. § 2.1 at 2. The chief difference is that a social-welfare
organization may lobby.
32
See id. at 5, citing the MinnesotaCare Act, MINN. STAT. 62N.02 (1997,
expired). Though the MinnesotaCare Act was ultimately abandoned, the mergers that it
encouraged remained intact. MinnesotaCare Act was an interesting example of the effort
to encourage integration that occurred across the country to encourage greater
efficiencies in healthcare delivery and finance. The Minnesota Health Care Commission
was charged with presenting a cost containment plan that would slow the health care
spending growth rate in Minnesota by January 1993. MINNESOTA HEALTH CARE
COMMISSION, CONTAINING COSTS IN MINNESOTA’S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (Aug. 13,
1999), http://www.health.state.mn.us/mhcc/costcont.htm. See also MINN. STAT. 62J.015
(1992). The Commission’s cost containment plan featured, among other things,
Integrated Service Networks (ISNs), which encouraged the development of competing
ISNs that were to be accountable for the cost and quality of their services and responsible
for providing a full array of health care services. See id. ISN services were to be
provided at fixed prices, which was intended to create incentives for participating
providers and health plans to operate efficiently. See id. The Commission called for
payment systems, purchasing reform, and health care data systems to facilitate
consumers’ ability to compare data on ISN prices and quality and to encourage
competition. See id. The bill was signed by Governor Carlson in April of 1992, and it
made Minnesota one of the first states to address the ‘epidemic’ of rising health care
costs. See Eric H. Chadwick, MinnesotaCare: Workable Financing or Just Wishful
Thinking?, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 961, 963 (1993); see also MINN. STAT. 62J.015.29 (1992). The MinnesotaCare Act was enacted in pieces dating from 1992 to 1997.
See TERESA A. COUGHLIN, SHRUTI RAJAN, STEPHEN ZUCKERMAN & JILL A. MARSTELLER,
URBAN INSTITUTE, HEALTH POLICY FOR LOW-INCOME PEOPLE IN MINNESOTA (Nov.1,
1997), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/Hp_minn.pdf. Following
multiple mergers, Minnesota was left with “four mega systems;” Allina, Blue Cross/Blue
Shield of Minnesota, Fairview, and Health Partners insured 90% of the state’s residents
by 2001. See Kaiser Daily Health Policy Report, Minnesota Health System ‘Under
Siege’ as Costs, Premiums Rise Faster Than National Average (July 24, 2001),
http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily_reports/rep_index.cfm?hint=3&DR_ID=5976. The
consolidation of the state’s healthcare systems caused concern among Minnesota
policymakers, who worried that the savings from the ISN consolidations would not be
passed through as reduced consumer premiums and health care service costs. See
HEALTH POLICY FOR LOW-INCOME PEOPLE IN MINNESOTA, 3. As a result, Minnesota
made efforts to prevent further consolidations, but it did not undo extant ISNs; the 1997
version of the MinnesotaCare Act sought to “eliminat[e] integrated service networks” in
favor of alternative service delivery mechanisms, such as Community Integrated Service
Networks (CISNs), purchasing cooperatives, and provider-sponsored organizations. MN
Legis. 225 (1997). Finally, the ISN law was repealed and draft ISN rules were discarded.
See MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 1997 MINNESOTACARE GROWTH LIMIT
IMPLEMENTATION REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Aug. 20, 1999) (on file with author).
MinnesotaCare proved to be a failed experiment; between 2000 and 2001, Minnesota’s
health care costs rose nearly twice as fast as the national average. Duane Benson, a
former supporter of MinnesotaCare, commented that the final result was “not what we
thought it would be.” See Kaiser Daily Health Policy Report, Minnesota Health System
‘Under Siege’ as Costs, Premiums Rise Faster Than National Average, (July 24, 2001),
http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily_reports/rep_index.cfm?hint=3&DR_ID=5976.
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proportionally small size within the conglomerate, and it was controlled
tightly by Allina.33 Allina had an umbrella board of directors comprised
of twenty voting members and up to eight ex-officio members (including
the president and chief executive officer of Allina).34 Of the twenty
Allina board members, seven served on the Medica board of directors
(separately), which contained seven board members total.35 Of the seven
board members, Allina had the ability to elect and remove four directors,
and the other three board members served at the pleasure of Allina (had
to be ratified by Allina).36 In simplified form, indulging the need to
overlook some of the many subsidiary and sub-subsidiary relationships,
the Allina Health System can be depicted as follows:37

Health Span
• Hospitals and clinics
resulting from
horizontal integration

Medica Health Plan (HMO)
• Over 500,000
insured lives

integration

Allina Health System – Umbrella Entity
• 8 nonprofit, tax exempt hospitals, and
• 4 operating divisions, unincorporated

8 nonprofit
healthcare
providers

3 joint
ventures
(seemingly
taxable)

7 taxable nonprofits
(one of which was
HealthSpan Medical
Management, the
parent company for
Medica Insurance
Company, a for-profit
corporation)

10 partnerships

2 trusts

5 for-profit
enterprises
including
Medica
Insurance
Company

As part of a compliance review of Allina, Minnesota Attorney
General Mike Hatch issued a six-volume finding that concluded Allina
and Medica could not coexist as an integrated delivery system.38
Attorney General Hatch found that the boards of Medica and Allina were
guilty of a host of errors that violated their fiduciary duties. To name a
33

See COMPLIANCE REVIEW, supra note 30, § 2.3 at 5.
See id. § 2.2 at 3.
35
See id.
36
See COMPLIANCE REVIEW, supra note 30, vol. 2, exhibit 6, Fifth Restated
Bylaws of Medica Health Plans.
37
See id., vol. 1, exhibit 5. The Organizational Chart is highly complex and the
key is difficult to decipher due to the variety of corporate entities involved; any errors are
due to the author’s inability to read the AG’s Organizational Chart as it was intended.
38
See id. § 1.11 at 27. Hatch wrote that there were “numerous and
irreconcilable conflicts of interest among the non-profit corporations and the
communities they serve.” Id.
34
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few: First, the boards of each entity overlapped to a great degree and
were elected solely by, or had to be approved by, Allina’s directors.39
Moreover, the board of Allina and the board of Medica met at the same
time; and, at concurrent meetings, the Allina board members appeared to
make all decisions for both Allina and Medica, referring to Medica as a
“division” even though it was a separate corporation.40
Second, one checking account was used for all Allina Health
System corporations (not just Allina and Medica).41 The Attorney
General acknowledged that this would not be unusual for one large
corporation. Because Allina consisted of numerous for-profit and
nonprofit corporations, however, Hatch stated that an accounting
impossibility was created and deemed it a deliberate scheme to confuse
the government and other interested parties.42 Hatch also concluded that
the “crisscross transactions” that occurred between the corporations in
the one checking account were breaches of the directors’ three fiduciary
duties.43
Third, Medica paid referral fees to certain influential physician
groups to increase patient referrals from those groups to Allina.44 This
served as evidence that the directors and officers of Allina who also
served as directors and officers of Medica were serving the corporate
interests and purposes of Allina at all times, not of Medica. This in turn
created a conflict of interest.45
Fourth, Medica pre-funded the medical services of Allina to
finance capital improvements needed by Allina; more specifically,
Medica paid Allina thirty million dollars before medical records existed
for the patients who had received services.46 Attorney General Hatch
found the pre-funding arrangement to be contrary to the sound fiscal
practices of a conventional HMO and a violation of the directors’
fiduciary duties.47 The attorney general also was troubled by Allina’s
39
See id. § 1.10 & exhibit 62 at 18 (Bylaws of Allina Health System, Article
VII, stating that the Board of Directors of Allina was responsible for electing all
Operating Unit Boards). Consumer members of the Medica board were elected by extant
consumer members of the board, but they had virtually no voting rights except to elect
the next set of consumer directors; though not elected by the Allina directors, they could
not be elected without approval of the Allina board. See id. § 2.3 at 6.
40
See id. § 2.16 at 32 (so referred in the board minutes).
41
See id. The Compliance Review notes that, in using one central business
office, the system used one checking account to process “in aggregate over $3 billion.”
Id. § 2.8 at 14.
42
See id. § 2.8 at 14-15.
43
See id. § 2.8 at 15.
44
See id. § 2.7 at 12. For instance, in 1998 Medica paid Aspen Clinic
approximately 13 million dollars to build patient referrals to Allina and 1.5 million
dollars in subsequent years to continue the influence. See id. This is potentially a
violation of certain federal statutes such as the anti-kickback statute, the “Stark” law, and
any state prohibitions on fee-splitting, but such fraud and abuse statutes were not the
focus of Attorney General Hatch’s investigation (or this paper).
45
See id. at 13. Attorney General Hatch asserts a breach of all three fiduciary
duties in the context of the referral fees. See id. The fees were not in the financial
interest of Medica, thus the accusation of only acting in Allina’s interest.
46
See id. § 2.9 at 16. Typically insurers review medical records to ensure
reasonableness and medical necessity before paying healthcare providers for the services
or items claimed. Prepaying is almost unheard-of.
47
See id. § 2.9 at 17.
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control over Medica’s ability to set fee schedules and by the increased
payments that Medica conferred on Allina.48
Fifth, Medica’s decision to remain in the Medicare + Choice
market -- when it was losing money in that market -- was deemed the
result of a conflict of interest. The decision clearly benefited Allina by
virtue of the increased hospital admissions of well-insured patients.
Allina earned a large amount of its revenue from the senior market, but
this decision deprived Medica of needed funds.49
Sixth, the Minnesota Attorney General’s office found that
conflicts of interest arose between the mission of Medica as an HMO and
the mission of Allina Health System, conflicts that appeared to deprive
the Medica directors of the ability to consider the best interests of the
HMO’s enrollees.50 Attorney General Hatch stated, “because it directly
owns [hospitals], the primary corporate responsibility of Allina Health
System is to assure the prudent and safe operation of these hospitals…
.”51 This assessment was grounded in the Minnesota statute that
describes the mission for hospitals (and other patient care entities) as,
essentially, the institutional care of human beings.52 On the other hand,
Attorney General Hatch stated that Medica had a “clear statutory
mission” to “manage health care costs and try to keep premiums
down.”53 This conclusion derived from the Minnesota enabling statute
for HMOs, which was created in 1973, presumably pursuant to the
mandate of the federal HMO Act of 1973.54 The Minnesota HMO
statutory language reflects findings made by the federal government that
HMOs were more efficient and therefore economically more sound than
traditional indemnity insurance.55 In light of the HMO statutory mission,
48

See id. § 2.11 at 20.
See id. § 2.14 at 25. By example, even though only 6.5% of enrollment in
Medica was attributable to Medicare, Medicare policies were responsible for 20% of net
operating losses for Medica in 1999. See id. As Attorney General Hatch wrote, “… there
was a clear conflict of interest between Allina Health Systems and Medica as it related to
the Medicare patient. Medica steadily lost money on Medicare policies while Allina
Hospitals clearly made money on the treatment of Medicare patients.” Id. at 29
(emphasis added).
50
See id. § 2.21 at 33-34.
51
See id. § 2.2 at 2.
52
See MN Stat. § 144.50. subd. 2 (1996). The statute states:
Hospital … shall mean any institution, place, building, or agency , in
which any accommodation is maintained, furnished, or offered for
five or more persons for: the hospitalization of the sick or injured; the
provision of care in a swing bed …; elective outpatient surgery for
preexamined, prediagnosed low risk patients; emergency medical
services offered 24 hours a day, seven days a week, in an ambulatory
or outpatient setting in a facility not a part of a licensed hospital; or
the institutional care of human beings.
Id.
53
COMPLIANCE REVIEW, supra note 30, § 2.4 at 7-8.
54
See 42 U.S.C. § 300e-10 (2000) (originally enacted as the Health
Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, § 2, 87 Stat. 931).
55
The Minnesota statute states:
Faced with a continuation of mounting costs of health care coupled
with its inaccessibility to large segments of the population, the
Legislature has determined that there is a need to explore alternative
methods for the delivery of health care services, with a view toward
achieving greater efficiency and economy in providing these services.
49
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Attorney General Hatch concluded that Medica’s mission conflicted with
Allina’s mission to ensure that the patient care side of its organizations
were “adequately capitalized and financed to serve the needs of
patients.”56 In other words, Medica had to create economic efficiencies
(pay less) while Allina had to increase its income to serve its patients
(charge more).57 Any action taken by the board of either entity contrary
to the mission of the entity would therefore, as Attorney General Hatch
stated, be a conflict of interest and impermissible as a breach of the duty
of loyalty and the duty of obedience.58
While the conclusions that Attorney General Hatch reached are
sound, disappointment arises from the lack of analysis or guiding
principles. The future IDS is left with an example of predecessors’
violations of fiduciary duties without any guiding analysis. While they
may be difficult to separate, no line was drawn between
licensure/mission conflicts and corporate/fiduciary duty conflicts.59 For
example, the Compliance Review crunches the numbers involved in the
pre-funding arrangement, and then concludes: “The officers and directors
of Medica, by permitting Medica to engage in a pre-funding transaction
with Allina, have compromised their duty of loyalty, of due care and of
obedience to the mission of Medica.”60 Ratifying the prepayment plan
undoubtedly was a breach of fiduciary duties by the Medica directors,
but an opportunity existed to describe that a breach of the duty of loyalty
occurred because the directors were diverting funds; and that a breach of
the duty of care occurred because the directors did not obtain the
necessary information to determine whether the funds should be
allocated as they were; and a breach of the duty of obedience occurred
because the licensure mission of Medica required it to ensure that it paid
money only for legitimate services while its corporate mission as a
nonprofit prevents private inurement and private benefit. Likewise, after
painstakingly tracing the complex history of Allina hospital mergers,
Medica’s history, corporate governance, and other details of Allina, the

Minn. Stat. 62D.01 subd. 2.
56
See COMPLIANCE REVIEW, supra note 30, § 2.5 at 9.
57
See id. § 2.6 at 9. Hatch made the following introductory statement,
[T]he object of a non-profit organization which owns hospital ought to be to
ensure safety and financial stability in its hospitals. The interest of a nonprofit
HMO, however, is presumably to make certain that premiums are efficiently
utilized on behalf of its members for quality health care. The goals of Medica
and Allina have clashed in a variety of ways over the past several years.
Id. § 1.10 at 22.
58
See id. The conclusion by Attorney General Hatch that the missions of an
HMO and a hospital system are irreconcilable leads to speculation regarding whether a
vertically integrated IDS with interlocking board members could ever exist. If the
statutory mission of a licensed HMO and a licensed hospital, ambulatory care facility,
nursing home – essentially any patient service – inherently conflict, then vertical
integration that includes the feature of interlocking directorates would never be
appropriate so long as healthcare entities cannot fully merge due to licensure constraints.
In the continuum of the history of integrated delivery systems, such a conclusion would
have been a major milestone.
59
Also unfortunately, the Compliance Review has statements like, “A more
serious concern is that Medica … [redacting begins].” COMPLIANCE REVIEW § 1.10 at 23.
One can only imagine what the more serious concerns might be.
60
COMPLIANCE REVIEW, supra note 30, § 2.9 at 17.
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finding avows, “Putting it simply, the mission of the Allina Health
System and Medica HMO are different and at times conflicting.”61
Perhaps the conclusory statements were due to the fact that the
duty of obedience is tied to the mission of a healthcare nonprofit, which
is in part dictated by statutory mission, but Attorney General Hatch did
not clarify whether this was the issue or the analysis. An opportunity
was missed to delineate such a distinction, which could have been
significant in the development of the doctrine of fiduciary duties for
healthcare entities. The distinction between corporate mission and
licensure mission is vital for parsing fiduciary duties for directors on
multiple boards; the contours of this idea will be discussed below.
B. The Hospital Chain
Where horizontal integration of healthcare providers occurs, it is
not unusual for systems to be governed either by one umbrella board of
directors or by placing members of each board of directors on the boards
of the other member entities within the system. While vertical mergers
slowed due to failures of the predicted economies of scale and healthcare
delivery, horizontal mergers appear to remain popular, particularly
among hospitals and physician groups.62
To imagine the complexities of horizontal integration, suppose
that a hospital chain is formed between two successful suburban
hospitals (Hospital A and Hospital B) and an occasionally-struggling
urban hospital (Urban Hospital). Each of the hospitals remains a
separately incorporated, nonprofit, tax-exempt hospital, and the
affiliation does not necessitate a modification of the nonprofit mission set
forth in each hospital’s articles of incorporation. To ensure a unity of
purpose, the members of the boards of directors begin to serve on the
board of at least one other board in the system, though no umbrella board
is formed. So, the system would appear as follows:

61

Id. § 2.5 at 9.
See Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State, 79
IND. L.J. 937, 939 (2004) (discussing the ongoing process of hospital integration in the
context of state interference in mergers and conversions). Allina furnishes us another
example for purposes of exploring overlapping boards. Before Allina and Medica
amalgamated, Allina grew as a horizontally integrated healthcare system through
merging a number of hospitals and then a number of nursing homes. Allina Health
System, as a horizontally integrated system, was created by a series of mergers that
occurred over the course of eleven years. The system consisted of no fewer than eleven
separate legal entities. Each of the hospitals within the system was treated as an
unincorporated operating unit of Allina. In deconstructing the structural and ethical
problems of Allina, Attorney General Hatch noted that the horizontal integration was
incomplete at the time of the merger with Medica. The hospitals were described as
competing with each other for patients (or “business”), having decentralized
administration, failing to centralize physicians’ services, and being inefficiently lead by
“co-leaders.” See COMPLIANCE REVIEW, supra note 30, § 2.2 at 2-4; see also Robert S.
Huckman, Hospital Integration and Vertical Consolidation: An Analysis of Acquisitions
in New York State, NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 11379, available for
purchase at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11379 (2005) (noting the significant number of
hospital consolidations and integrations over the past two decades).
62
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Urban Hospital
Board Members:
A, B, I, J, K, L, M

Suburban Hospital A
Board Members:
A, B, C, D, E, F

Suburban Hospital B
Board Members:
E, F, G, H, I, J

As a result of the merger, the controlling board members are able
to move the entire neurosurgery department to Hospital A, and the
neurosurgeons have relocated their offices to Hospital A to centralize this
set of highly specialized and highly lucrative services. A cardio-thoracic
center of excellence is created at Hospital B, which will require the subspecialized cardiac physicians from Urban Hospital and Hospital A to
relocate to Hospital B. Though some patients will have to travel a
greater distance to obtain these specialized services, the consolidation
enables the hospitals to create true depth and expertise in neurology and
cardiology, facilitating optimal levels of office and operating room
experience, creating the foundation for research, and serving the
system’s larger community with services that are improved from a
quality and a cost perspective. Other specialized services are moved
around as well, but each hospital maintains the basic services required to
be deemed a general hospital, including an emergency room.
Seemingly as a result of the affiliation and the attendant shifting
of services, Urban Hospital starts to lose money on an annual basis. The
other hospitals in the system are financially stable, and Hospital A is
turning a comfortable profit due to the increase in neurosurgery. The
board of directors of Urban Hospital holds a meeting specifically to
discuss the deficit that Urban Hospital is carrying. The members of the
board decide that it is in the best interest of the integrated delivery
system to contribute fifty percent of the profits of each hospital to Urban
Hospital until a new business plan can be found and instituted for Urban
Hospital. In this way, Urban Hospital can continue to treat the two
populations that rely on it the most, charity care patients who use the
emergency room in a clinic capacity, and trauma patients who are seen
first in the emergency room of Urban Hospital but who may, upon
stabilization, be referred to Hospital A or Hospital B for advanced or
continuing care.
The suburban hospital board members are potentially breaching
their fiduciary duties (namely duty of loyalty) to the Hospital A and
Hospital B simply by supporting Urban Hospital. The board members
from Urban Hospital, sitting on the boards of Hospital A and Hospital B,
are breaching fiduciary duties (namely duty of care) that they owe to
their hospital if too much time is taken attending to the needs of the
suburban hospitals. While it is doubtful that the board members of
Hospitals A and B would be found to violate the duty of care (the
procedure by which they reach the decision to support Urban Hospital
seems reasoned and informed), it is highly probable that they are
violating their duty of loyalty to Hospital A and Hospital B by shifting
funds to Urban Hospital. It is also possible that the duty of obedience is
being breached if the statutory mandate of each separately incorporated
hospital requires that profits be used to further the charitable purpose of
that particular nonprofit organization.
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On the other hand, the missions of the hospitals, from a licensure
perspective, would be nearly if not totally identical. In this case, the
generic overarching mission of a hospital, to ensure that care is provided
to everyone in the community and that it is adequately funded, is met. It
is then possible that the duty of obedience is not breached while the duty
of loyalty is called into question. As a policy matter, the public is served
by supporting and maintaining Urban Hospital, both in terms of public
health and in terms of the public fisc (the more Urban Hospital is
supported by the system hospitals, the less it must be supported by
charity care reimbursement and other funds that derive from taxpayer
dollars). We can see that traditional definitions of fiduciary duties do not
serve the board members, or the communities their organizations
support, very well.
C. The Small Town Joint Venture
The third example is a smaller, community-based hospital
(Hometown Hospital) and a home health agency (HHA) that share board
members. Hometown Hospital treats a large number of elderly patients,
and it is a major source of referrals for HHA. The nurses at Hometown
Hospital are specifically trained in the criteria for receiving
reimbursement for home health services, and some of them are
independent contractors who also work for the home health agency. As
is common in rural and smaller communities, Hometown Hospital and
HHA work together to ensure that qualifying patients are funneled to
HHA. The boards contain overlapping members because the community
lacks volunteers, and because it keeps business flowing well; everyone is
satisfied with the arrangement.
HHA reevaluates its business plan and decides that it should
serve the competing hospital in the neighboring town (Neighbor
Hospital) in order to stay financially healthy; reimbursement rates are not
what they used to be. HHA commences discussions with Neighbor
Hospital to place nurses at the hospital a few days per week. HHA does
not want to alert Hometown Hospital of its new enterprise for fear of
losing patient referrals from Hometown Hospital. HHA believes
Hometown Hospital will be concerned that HHA may not be serving its
patients as thoroughly as it could be and may be concerned that HHA is
diverting patients to Neighbor Hospital when opportunities arise.
Board members who sit on both boards, upon learning of the
relationship with Neighbor Hospital, will suffer from divided loyalties at
the least. Though no usurpation of corporate opportunity is occurring by
a member of the board – the traditional definition of a conflict of interest
– any board member who sits on both boards now has information that is
detrimental to Hometown Hospital if it is not revealed and detrimental to
HHA if it is revealed. The small town operation has a dissimilar feel
from the large healthcare systems; we may have different expectations
for rural and small-time entities, but courts expect the directors to
execute their fiduciary duties with the same level of care, loyalty, and
obedience. The conundrum is clear; and, whatever the directors do, the
mere possession of information is outside the usual bounds of courts’
analysis of the duty of loyalty.
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II.

Fiduciary Duties – Traditional Doctrine, Modern Shortcomings

The notion of fiduciary duties stems from both charitable trust
and corporate law principles and extends to the nonprofit corporate
sector in distinctive ways. Although the actions of nonprofit boards of
directors have been granted more than the usual amount of deference by
courts because members generally serve unpaid, the conduct of nonprofit
boards of directors is governed by standards substantially similar to those
that govern for-profit organizations.63 In no small part, this parallel is
due to the principles set forth in the Revised Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act.64 Unlike for-profit corporate directors, however,
nonprofit directors owe fiduciary duties to both the corporation and the
public.65 Thus, we see that nonprofit directors must adhere to the two
most familiar fiduciary duties, the duty of care and the duty of loyalty,
but directors of nonprofit corporations have been held recently to a third
duty, the duty of obedience. The duty of obedience is tied to the public
benefit aspect of nonprofit status that is particularly important for
healthcare entities.66
A. The Duties Reviewed
Blacks Law Dictionary defines the doctrine of fiduciary duties
thus: “A duty to act for someone else’s benefit, while subordinating
one’s personal interest to that of the other person. It is the highest
standard of duty implied by law (e.g. trustee, guardian).”67 Healthcare
nonprofits experience a greater imbalance of power than other nonprofits
due to the nature of the provision of healthcare and lack of medical
knowledge of the typical beneficiary of a healthcare nonprofit, the
patient.68 That directors have so much responsibility, and so little
oversight, is of concern to many and helps to explain the need for greater
recognition of the duty of obedience, which will be discussed below and
addressed by suggestions in this article.69

63

See RMNCA § 8.30 (1987).
See id.
65
See HOWARD L. OLECK, NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS AND
ASSOCIATIONS 265 (5th ed. 1988).
66
See Naomi Ono, Boards of Directors Under Fire: An Examination of
Nonprofit Board Duties in the Health Care Environment, 7 ANN. HEALTH L. 107, 108
(1998); DANIEL L. KURTZ, BOARD LIABILITY: GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 84
(1988).
67
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 625 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
68
See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of the Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J.
835, 862 (1980) (discussing the problem of the contract analogy for nonprofits that
provide complex personal services).
69
See Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and
Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 632-33
(1998) (observing that many nonprofits have directors who are no more than “window
dressing” and that ineffective governance hinders the ability of nonprofits to carry out
their missions).
64
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1. The Duty of Care
The duty of care requires directors to act in an informed, careful
manner and to affirmatively protect the interests of their organization.70
This is traditionally framed by asking whether directors have: (1) acted
in good faith, (2) with the degree of diligence, care and skill that
ordinary, prudent persons would exercise in like circumstances, and (3)
in the best interests of the corporation.71 Thus, the duty of care refers to
the way in which directors arrive at decisions made on behalf of the
corporation, not the validity or soundness of the decisions themselves.72
A court reviewing an alleged breach of the duty will consider process,
not substance.
Directors who have met the elements of the duty of care are
generally protected from personal liability by courts under the business
judgment rule,73 which shields directors from judicial scrutiny when they
act reasonably and in an informed manner on behalf of the corporation.74
Though anecdotal evidence indicates that the business judgment rule is
applied less frequently to the directors of nonprofit corporations, it can
still protect them from liability for bad outcomes.75 An outstanding
question is whether state attorneys general will apply the business
judgment rule when exercising their oversight of nonprofits.76
70

See KURTZ, supra note 66, at 22-30 (exploring the meaning and contours of
the duty of care).
71
See GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, 19 (George
W. Overton, Jeannie Carmedelle Frey eds., 2002) [hereinafter GUIDEBOOK]. The third
element overlaps with the duty of loyalty and is not always described as a required
element of the duty of care.
72
See Fishman, supra note 8, at 232 (discussing the meaning of the duty of
care).
73
See KURTZ, supra note 66, at 49 (discussing the nature of the business
judgment rule). Fishman calls this the “best judgment rule” in the nonprofit setting. See
Fishman, supra note 8, at 233.
74
See KURTZ, supra note 66, at 49-51 (discussing the doctrine of the business
judgment rule).
75
Some believe directors of nonprofits need the protection of the business
judgment rule less than the directors of for-profit corporations because courts are
traditionally lenient with nonprofit directors due to the voluntary nature of their service.
See id. at 50. Kurtz notes, “Is there a suitable alternative need or justification for the rule
for nonprofits and, if so, when should it be applied? To some extent, that justification
may be found in the uncompensated nature of the service of the typical nonprofit director,
whom courts are reluctant to hold to too exacting a standard of conduct.” Id. Note that
the business judgment rule never applies to breaches of the duty of loyalty. See id. at 4950; see also Lawrence E. Singer, The Conversion Conundrum: The State and Federal
Response to Hospitals’ Changes in Charitable Status, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 221, 235
(1997). Singer notes that generally the decisions of the directors of nonprofits are
protected by the business judgment rule, but the rule offers no shield where self-dealing
is alleged; as a corollary, plaintiffs who breach claims for breaches of fiduciary duties are
most successful when the duty of loyalty is implicated. See id.
76
See MARYLAND INSURANCE ADMINISTRATION, LEGISLATIVE REPORT ON MIA
ORDER NO. 2003-02-032, 111 (July 3, 2003), available at
http://www.mdinsurance.state.md.us/documents/LegislativeCareFirstReport07-03.pdf
(reporting that the Maryland Commissioner of Insurance deliberately ignored the
business judgment rule in order to investigate and prevent the proposed conversion of
CareFirst, the sole member of Blue Cross Blue Shield in Maryland, Delaware, and
Washington, D.C.). The Commissioner unequivocally stated that the business judgment
rule had “no place” in the regulatory proceeding. Id. at 71-72.
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2. The Duty of Loyalty
The duty of loyalty commonly is described as requiring directors
to act without self-interest, in good faith, and in the best interests of the
corporation that they serve, at all times.77 This entails both an
affirmative duty to protect the interests of the corporation and an
obligation to refrain from conduct that would injure the corporation.78
The duty of loyalty derives from state statutory law, the Revised Model
Nonprofit Corporation Act, caselaw, and occasionally from Internal
Revenue Service rulings and interpretations.79
Breaches of the duty of loyalty arise when a director has a
conflict of interest, which traditionally has been deemed to occur in three
situations. In the first, a director has interests on both sides of a
transaction and could experience personal monetary gain if the
transaction were approved.80 In the second, the director appropriates a
corporate opportunity without notifying the board or management of the
existence of the opportunity, thus usurping potential financial reward for
the corporation.81 A third breach of the duty of loyalty occurs when a
director provides an economic benefit for a third party, even if the third
party is another nonprofit organization.82
The key to each of the three traditional breaches is that the
director is using the corporation for monetary benefit, which would be a
particular problem for nonprofit corporations due to their corporate
nonprofit purpose.83 Using the nonprofit for personal gain is contrary not
only to the general nonprofit corporate standards but also violates the
public trust placed in nonprofits. In modern healthcare, however,
breaches of the duty of loyalty can also occur when a director makes a
decision that is detrimental to the welfare of one corporation to benefit
another – a control (as opposed to monetary) situation that is not
contemplated by traditional duty of loyalty doctrine.
When nonprofit directors encounter situations in which a conflict
of interest could arise, the duty of loyalty has been interpreted to
command that the conflicted director “act with candor and care.”84 The
77

See GUIDEBOOK, supra note 71, at 29. Under the duty of loyalty, nonprofit
directors are required “to exercise their powers in good faith and in the best interests of
the corporation.” Id.
78
See id. (stating that the duty of loyalty contains the negative principle that
“the director shall not use a corporate position for individual personal advantage”); see
also J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 200 (1995).
79
See Schumpeter, supra note 3, at 1583 (describing the different areas of the
law that affect nonprofit corporations and noting that nonprofits are subject to and benefit
from the tax-exempt regulatory regime).
80
See KURTZ, supra note 66, at 59.
81
See id. A corporate opportunity has been appropriated when a director uses
his position to capitalize on a business opportunity that more properly belongs to the
organization. See Ono, supra note 66, at 115 (citing Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del.
1939)).
82
See KURTZ, supra note 67, at 59.
83
This constraint is honored in the duty of obedience, discussed in the next
sub-section.
84
See GUIDEBOOK, supra note 71, at 30.
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permissibility of a nonprofit corporation undertaking a conflicted
transaction, then, is dependent on the manner in which the director
handles the conflict.85 Although conflict of interest transactions indicate
a breach of the director’s duty of loyalty, conflicted transactions are not
automatically void, despite that breach of fiduciary duty.86 To prevent
the nullification of a conflicted deal, the corporation must be able to
demonstrate that (1) the challenged transaction “was approved by a
disinterested majority of the board . . . after full disclosure by the
affected director of the material facts regarding the transaction and the
director’s interest therein,” or (2) the challenged transaction “was fair to
the corporation at the time it was entered into.”87 Prior to becoming
involved in a transaction that may provide a corporate opportunity to an
organization, directors have usually been instructed that they should
disclose the facts surrounding the transaction to the board of directors “in
sufficient detail and in adequate time to enable the board to act or decline
to act” with regard to the questionable transaction.88 Thus, nonprofit
directors are obligated to make objective decisions for the corporations
that they serve and must either refrain from or obtain approval for
entering into transactions where objectivity may be compromised.89
The expectation that directors will intuitively know when “in
adequate time” occurs and what constitutes “sufficient detail” is
unreasonable (for both for-profits and nonprofits), as is the notion that
fiduciaries should simply know how to interpret conflicts with little to no
guidance. The focus on a particular transaction and its monetary
implications is perplexing, as the per-transaction standard leaves
directors with no principled direction, particularly when they serve
multiple boards or when they serve mirror boards (i.e. boards that
contain the same directors). Strictly speaking, a director is automatically
violating the duty of loyalty by serving more than one board because the
duty requires the director to act in the best interest of the corporation at
all times. Tension immediately arises from the service of multiple
boards; and directors sitting on mirror boards, under the traditional rule,
could never consummate a conflicted transaction, which would result in
complete inertia.
3. The Duty of Obedience
The doctrine of fiduciary duties has been expanded in the
nonprofit context, at least by a handful of courts, to include a new duty
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that is key to this discussion: the duty of obedience.90 This duty directs
board members to ensure allegiance to the entity’s charitable mission and
to obey all laws relevant to the organization.91 While the duty of
obedience was once subsumed within the duty of care for nonprofit
corporations (a holdover from borrowing general corporate law
principles), some courts have recognized it as a distinct fiduciary duty for
nonprofit board members.92 In order to understand this duty, it is helpful
to describe how healthcare nonprofits’ missions are formulated. To
facilitate the discussion herein, I have separated the discussion into what
I call charter mission and licensure mission.
a. Charter Mission
The corporate purpose of a nonprofit corporation is stated in its
articles of incorporation (also called the corporate charter) and in its
bylaws. The corporate purpose stated in the charter is dictated in part by
state statute, meaning the reasons that a state’s nonprofit act allows an
entity to be organized as a nonprofit corporation and to receive state nontaxable status.93 In addition, the application for the corporation’s federal
tax-exempt status may contain a more specific description of the
organization’s nonprofit goals.94 Corporate purpose is particularly
important for nonprofit organizations, as they can only incorporate for
the permitted reasons delineated in the incorporating state’s nonprofit
corporation statute. Failure to so organize, or failure to so operate, can
remove the state’s imprimatur to operate as a nonprofit corporation. The
corporation would lose tax-free status at the state level and perhaps be
forced to return profits to the state that would have been collected from a
for-profit organization, and it could result in loss of federal tax-exempt
90
The following summarizes the states that have adopted the duty of obedience
for nonprofit directors either by common law or statute (though not always in the
healthcare context): California has interpreted the duty of obedience strictly (see Queen
of Angles Hosp. v. Younger, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36 (Ct. App. 1977); New York too has taken
a strict view of the duty of obedience (see MEETH v. Spitzer, 186 Misc. 2d 126 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1999); see also Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. State of New York, 840 N.E.2d
68 (N.Y. 2005)). Other states have afforded nonprofit directors more flexibility in
fulfilling their missions: Missouri is one example (see Taylor v. Baldwin, 247 S.W.2d
741 (Mo. 1952)); New Jersey is another (see City of Paterson v. Paterson Gen. Hosp.,
235 A.2d 487 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967)). Other states are on the cusp; for instance,
in Georgia the duty has been recognized in a dissenting opinion (see Shorter College v.
Baptist Convention of Georgia, 614 SE.2d 37 (Ga. 2005)).
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See MEETH, 186 Misc. 2d at 152.
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See Goldschmid, supra note 69, at 641 (acknowledging the analytical reasons
for separating duty of care and duty of obedience but choosing to subsume duty of
obedience within the duty of care for purposes of for-profit analog analysis). Some
courts have described the duty of obedience as part of the duty of loyalty. By example,
the court in Summers v. Cherokee Children & Family Service, 112 S.W.3d 486 (Tenn. Ct.
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504. Some consider the duty of obedience to be a partnership principle that derives from
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Ill. Prac., Business Organizations, § 3.17A (2004) (describing the fiduciary duty of each
partner to facilitate the chosen action).
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status (most likely under Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3) for a
healthcare provider).
State nonprofit statutes tend to list cursorily the possible
purposes for which a nonprofit may be incorporated, and the list usually
includes such purposes as educational, religious, charitable,
eleemosynary, and fraternal; healthcare is generally considered to be a
“charitable” activity and tends not to be listed separately.95 The absence
of healthcare in most nonprofit statutes forces incorporators of healthcare
nonprofits to rely on historical statements of nonprofit corporate purpose
for other healthcare entities’ charter missions.
From the state’s perspective, it is important for healthcare
nonprofits to adhere to their corporate purpose so that the state can easily
determine that ongoing tax-exempt status is warranted. From the entity’s
perspective, being true to corporate purpose can facilitate constancy and
continuity for the typical revolving door of board members, officers, and
employees. Notably, different healthcare nonprofits may have very
similar charter missions; for example, two general hospitals incorporated
in the same state are likely to have the same charter mission.
b. Licensure Mission
The mission of a healthcare entity also derives from its license to
provide healthcare; I call this licensure mission. Consistent with the
highly regulated nature of healthcare, every healthcare provider must be
licensed to provide the services of that type of institution in each state in
which the services are offered. For instance, a hospital must be licensed
under department of health rules in the state(s) in which the hospital
provides services.
Licensure mission, therefore, is the intended
healthcare purpose of the organization as dictated by the statutory and
regulatory schemes that create the licensure of the entity.
Licensure mission is unlike charter mission in a few respects.
First, jurisdictionally, the statutory schemes are distinct in creation and in
enforcement. Corporate charters are overseen by state departments of
treasury, while licensure of healthcare entities is performed by state
departments of health. Second, each serves a separate purpose and
defines the corporation differently. Charter mission explains the type of
special corporation, but licensure mission defines the services provided
to the community. Third, the enforcement of the two missions is
accomplished by different means and with different goals in mind.
Though both ultimately serve the community, adherence to charter
mission could be described as a furtherance of fiscal trust, while
95

See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 273.167 (West 2005), which states in
typical fashion:
Corporations may be organized under KRS 273.161 to 273.390 for any lawful
purpose or purposes, including, without being limited to, any one or more of
the following purposes: charitable; benevolent; eleemosynary; educational;
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provisions of the insurance laws or banking laws of this state may not be
organized under KRS 273.161 to 273.390.
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adherence to licensure mission could be described as adherence to
medical standards and purposes. The two missions overlap, but they are
established by dissimilar means. Perhaps more than nonprofit charter
mission, the licensure mission could help to guide directors in their
service to the organization and its community.
c. Mission Interpretation
Traditionally directors have been granted considerable latitude in
interpreting broadly-stated objectives for their nonprofit corporations;
however, a few courts have interpreted the duty of obedience as charging
directors with adhering to the charter’s stated objectives, even if
alternatives exist that directors believe may be better for the corporation
and/or necessary for the served community.96 This doctrine and its
consequences illuminate a major difference between nonprofits and
general corporations, and it is worth restating -- nonprofits can exist only
for a purpose specified by the relevant state nonprofit corporation act,
which must be mentioned in the entity’s articles of incorporation.97 If the
nonprofit neglects its declared purpose(s), then theoretically the
nonprofit must cease operations or become a for-profit corporation and
divest a portion of its past profits.98
The duty of obedience is strikingly similar to a trustee’s duty to
administer a trust in a manner that is consistent with the wishes of the
trust’s creator, as it requires that directors maintain and promote the
corporation’s charitable or public interest purpose.99 The obvious
difference is that the creator of the trust in this case is the state, which
has decided the permissible objectives for nonprofit corporations and
their state tax-exempt status. States then allow the trust that is the
nonprofit corporation to self-administer its charitable goals, often with
little more guidance than to obey the corporate mission.
The rationale of the duty of obedience stems from the notion that
nonprofit corporations are characterized by their specific, statesanctioned objectives, but they may not be driven by desire to generate a
profit.100 Additional justification for the duty grows from the idea that
donations to nonprofit corporations “are made in reliance upon the
fulfillment of those charitable purposes.”101 The duty of obedience also
96
See FURROW ET AL., supra note 99, at 509. See also MEETH 186 Misc. 2d at
149, 152, 155. Note, however, that a nonprofit board may modify the fundamental
objectives of an organization if it amends its articles of formation and its bylaws, and if it
notifies the appropriate state officials. See RMNCA §§ 10.01-10.02, 10.05.
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See Fishman, supra note 8, at 237 (stating that directors have in the duty of
obedience a responsibility that resembles trustees’ duty to administer the trust in the
manner proscribed by the trust’s creator because the directors of a nonprofit must adhere
to the purposes for which the nonprofit was created).
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which state attorneys general have gone in pursuit of recompense when nonprofit
healthcare organizations convert.
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See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS 508-09 (3d ed. 1997).
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reflects an underlying reality that the ability to utilize private funds is
contingent on the confidence that donors have in the honesty of those
ultimately accountable for managing them.102 With this background,
some courts have rejected any shift of corporate resources to other
objectives, despite the seeming merit of those other objectives.103
Though it is difficult to discuss the duty of obedience without
visiting Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer (“MEETH”), the
proverbial jury is still out on whether this case will become paradigmatic
or atypical.104 In MEETH, a financially-strapped hospital sought
authorization from the New York State Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer,
to sell a substantial portion of its assets to a cancer center and a real
estate developer.105 The authorization arguably was obligatory under the
terms of New York Not-for-Profit Corporation Law section 511, which
requires that a New York court determine whether transactions are fair
and reasonable to the not-for-profit corporation and promote the
objectives of the organization.106 Attorney General Spitzer determined
that the sale would have altered the mission of MEETH by incorporating
“unstudied and unevaluated charitable purposes” into the original
mission.107 As a result, Spitzer objected to MEETH’s petition, asserting
that MEETH accepted the offers without considering other possibilities
that potentially would have advanced the original objectives of
MEETH.108 The court held that MEETH failed to meet both prongs of
the section 511 test not only because the terms of the transaction failed to
account for MEETH’s value as a going concern and for the value of the
good will in MEETH’s name, but also because the directors failed to
demonstrate that the sale would promote the founding, declared purposes
of the organization.109
In discussing the duty of obedience, the MEETH court declared
that nonprofit directors must remain faithful to the purposes and
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objectives of the organization they serve.110 The court observed that in
limited cases financial difficulties may necessitate the sale of an
organization’s assets and the assumption of a new mission, but the duty
of obedience requires the directors to first and foremost preserve the
organization’s original mission.111 Ultimately the court held that a sale
will not be approved for a nonprofit corporation if it fails to promote the
purposes of the corporation (and indicates the advancement of a new
mission) when no reasoned determination proves that the original
mission could not be continued.112
MEETH exhibits the heightened interest in the concept of the
duty of obedience. If enforced, this duty can act as a rein on board
activities, but the more important issue is whether board members
appreciate what it means to adhere to their own statutory mission, and
how license-based mission can expound on the statutory mission of a
healthcare nonprofit. More than the duty of loyalty, the duty of
obedience may help to refine doctrine surrounding conflicts of interest.
B.

The Void of Guidance

“What is unclear, however, is what nonprofit boards are actually
supposed to do.”113 Directors in modern healthcare nonprofits frequently
serve more than one board, yet no authority addresses this common
occurrence, making it difficult for directors to fulfill fiduciary
obligations.114 The caselaw that does exist rarely if ever addresses
broader principles of loyalty or obedience.115 Other sources of authority,
such as the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporations Act, fail to provide
adequate information, even in explanatory comments.116
1. Caselaw, By Example
Nonprofit corporations have generated caselaw that is
discombobulated at best.117 The lack of consistent standards by which to
understand the fiduciary duties of boards of directors is confused by
courts’ inability to determine whether the corporate standard or the
charitable trust standard is persuasive; Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes
National Training School for Deaconesses and Missionaries (“Stern”)
serves as a cogent example. Also, extant guidance is retroactive and
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generally too circumstance-specific to guide directors in future actions in
a meaningful way; MEETH is an example of this problem.118
Stern involved breaches of the duty of care and duty of loyalty by
the board of a hospital.119 Before determining whether fiduciary duties
were breached, the court had to determine which standard to use,
charitable trust or general corporate; this was particularly an issue
because the first version of the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act did not
adopt fiduciary duties for nonprofit board members.120 Because the
trouble in Stern was failure to manage (rather than mismanagement), the
directors would have breached their duty of care regardless of the
standard applied.121 Nevertheless, Stern helped to establish that
nonprofit directors can be held liable for “gross negligence” when their
mismanagement leads to corporate losses.122
In the context of this discussion, Stern set forth the standard that
the duty of loyalty is breached when a director knowingly permits the
nonprofit organization to enter a business transaction either with himself
or with an entity in which he has a substantial interest without informing
the board of his interest and then withdrawing from a vote on the
transaction.123 Dicta of the Stern court is remarkable for not having been
followed despite its prescience; the court stated that a director is
responsible for ensuring that the directors who are charged with
approving the interested transaction are informed not only of the
conflicted director’s interest, but also of any “significant reasons,
unknown or not fully appreciated by such persons, why the transaction
might not be in the best interests” of the healthcare organization.124 The
Stern court began to grapple with the importance of information and the
need for uninterested (or un-conflicted) directors to appreciate what
might not be in the best interests of the corporation, even if no usurpation
or actual financial conflict exists.125
118
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More specifically, the Stern court had an opportunity to explore the
idea of a duality of interest, as the hospital had adopted guidelines
promulgated by the American Hospital Association (AHA) that formed a
model conflict of interest policy. In this policy, the AHA explained that
modern hospitals were likely to have board members that experienced a
“duality” of interest or conflict of interest because board members were
likely to be chosen for their “expertise, their leadership … in other fields,
or their specialized representation of significant community interests.”126
The AHA’s ethics advisory document strongly recommended that such
dualities be disclosed and made a “matter of record through an annual
procedure and also when the interest becomes a matter of board
action.”127 The AHA recognized that such dualities could be beneficial
for the hospital; however, the Stern court did not explore the possibilities
for expanded discourse of conflicts presented by the case.
MEETH also is cited as a modern case that hashes out the
intricacies of board duties.128 As was discussed above, the members of
the board of directors of MEETH were deemed to violate their fiduciary
duties (specifically, the duty of care) by accepting an offer for the sale of
the historic Manhattan hospital before investigating options that would
have adhered to the original mission of the hospital.129 The trouble with
MEETH as a discussion of fiduciary duties is at least threefold. First, the
case is founded on a unique state law that requires court approval to sell
all or substantially all of the assets of a not-for-profit corporation.130
New York appears to be virtually alone in mandating court oversight;
most states simply require some form of notice, often to the state
attorney general.131 Second, the case merely instructs boards of directors
on how not to act; the two-pronged test set forth by the court is an
interpretation of a state law that does not inform boards regarding their
future conduct. Third, the New York statute is a quasi-cy pres scheme
that does not contain many direct analogs. Thus, even the ‘model’
caselaw for nonprofits does not significantly advance understanding of
the doctrine of fiduciary duties.
2. The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act
The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (“RMNCA”) also
fails to provide directors with a meaningful method of parsing fiduciary
duties. In fact, the drafters of the RMNCA appear to have deliberately
narrowed the sections of the act that address conflicts of interest.132 The
RMNCA was a complete amendment of the original Model Nonprofit
126
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Corporation Act, and the revision was supposed to improve on the
original model act’s obvious deficiencies, such as a complete lack of
defining principles for the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.133
While the intent of the drafters of the RMNCA was to include
guidance on conflicts of interest, they defined conflicts too narrowly for
the model to be of much use. The drafters decided that fiduciary duties
protect the interests of those who make donations to public benefit
corporations so that donors know that their monies will only be used for
the intended public purpose, not for directors’ personal benefit.134 The
narrow focus on monetary issues facilitated the narrow scope of the
doctrine as it became codified in state law. The authors of the RMNCA
acknowledged the debate about the appropriate model for nonprofit
corporations (trust versus general corporation), and they chose the model
of a general corporation with “little difficulty.”135
Thus, the RMNCA describes the duty of care as the same duty that
directors of for-profit corporations owe – the duty of an ordinarily
prudent person under like circumstances.136 This provides much in the
way of leeway and little in the way of guidance. Likewise, regarding the
duty of loyalty, the RMNCA states that directors must act in good faith
and in a manner “they reasonably believe to be in the best interests of the
corporation.”137 The comment explicitly states that the development of
standards in the area of the duty of loyalty is left to the court system.138
As discussed above, this has not occurred, and the courts have not
provided meaningful instruction to directors.
The RMNCA also does not provide advice or standards on the duty
of obedience.139 The drafters deliberately left the matter of corporate
purpose to state courts and to the Internal Revenue Service, as they
perceived the matter of corporate purpose as tied to satisfying 501(c)(3)
requirements.140 At the time it was drafted, the authors of the RMNCA
133
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found it sufficient to delineate what constitutes a conflict of interest
transaction and to provide for attorney general oversight to prevent
abuses by directors of public benefit nonprofit corporations.141 Times
have changed, though, and the RMNCA has become outdated.
III. The For-Profit Corporate Approach Is Unsatisfactory for the
Nonprofit Healthcare Organization
For-profit general corporations have been utilizing the ‘inform
and recuse’ method codified by Delaware statutory section 144 for many
years.142 Essentially this method requires the conflicted director to reveal
the existence of the conflict and then to remove herself from voting on
the issue. This approach is deemed to remove the “taint” from the
transaction, and thereby courts apply the business judgment rule to the
decision-making of the non-conflicted directors and ignore any conflicts
that would otherwise void a transaction. The subtext to this approach is
that the directors will not be faced with the scenario that healthcare
nonprofits face -- the inevitability of repetition, which may be unique to
healthcare nonprofits due to the need to adhere to charter mission and
licensure mission. Further, directors in the for-profit sector, especially in
publicly held corporations, are subject to a variety of controls that simply
do not exist for nonprofit organizations.143
General business corporations are “an instrument through which
capital is assembled for the activities of producing and distributing goods
and services and making investments … with a view to enhancing
corporate profit and shareholder gain.”144 While the mission of a
nonprofit is its foundation and raison d’etre, the mission of a for-profit is
141
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simply to earn money for the continuing success of the corporation and
the happiness of its shareholders.145 Setting aside healthcare purpose
momentarily, for-profits and nonprofits can be differentiated easily by
the financial imperative and the markets in which general corporations
operate.146 For-profit entities are subject to different restrictions than
nonprofits, particularly if they are publicly traded; also, they have
markets in which they must compete, and they have shareholders, each
of which exert some degree of control over the purpose of the forprofit.147 For-profits’ charters state typically they are formed for ‘any
lawful purpose,’ or (bluntly) any lawful method to prosper for
shareholders; they are not restricted by notions of mission.148 In the
general corporate sector, entities tend to merge and/or otherwise transact
in such a way that the matter for which the conflict exists is unlikely to
arise again, even if directorates overlap.149
Delaware recognizes that serving in multiple directorates is
possible and that serving more then one board is not per se invalid.150
Delaware courts have acknowledged that it is common for directors to
serve more than one board and that such directors owe the same fiduciary
duties to each corporation; neither may dilute the duties owed to the
other.151 The Delaware common law on interested transactions that once
resembled the per se voidability of trusts has been invalidated by the
1967 enactment of section 144. 152 Now, to be disqualified under
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by or protected by shareholder voting in the context of acquisitions).
148
See Peggy Sasso, Searching for Trust in the Not-for-Profit Boardroom:
Looking Beyond The Duty of Obedience To Ensure Accountability, 50 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1485 (2003). Lamenting the omission of the duty of obedience from the RMNCA, the
author states,
[T]he RMNCA carries its theme of creating symmetry between nonprofit and
for-profit corporate law to an illogical extreme. The two entities measure
accountability by very different standards, with the for-profit corporation
relying on market indicators to assess performance, while the not-for-profit
corporation derives its standard of accountability from legal and social norms.
Presumably the RMNCA assumed the duty of obedience was adequately
addressed through duties of care and loyalty.
Id. at 1522.
149
The exception is a transaction that results in or deals with a wholly-owned
or non-wholly-owned subsidiary, in which case general corporations may face similar
issues to healthcare nonprofits. See, e.g., Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E.
Corp., 545 A.2d 1171 (Del. 1988).
150
See ERNEST L. FOLK, FOLK ON DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW §144.10 (Aspen
1992), noting, “Interlocked boards are ‘not in themselves unlawful,’ and charter or bylaw provisions that ‘merely facilitate[] the functioning of the [interlocked] board, cannot
be said to constitute a contract contrary to public policy.’” Id. (citing Sterling v.
Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 118-19 (Del. 1952)).
151
See Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487 (Del. Ch. 1966).
152
See Potter v. Sanitary Co. of America, 194 A. 87 (Del. Ch. 1937) (strongly
condemning interested director behavior). Historically, transactions between

30

Delaware law, a director must have a “substantial” interest such that the
director could not make a decision based solely on the corporate merits
of the transaction because she is too influenced by “personal or
extraneous considerations.”153 Thus, not only are interested transactions
not per se invalid, but the standard by which directors are determined to
be “interested” gives directors great flexibility.
The permissive approach embraced by Delaware for general
corporations is illuminated by Warshaw v. Calhoun, in which the
Delaware Chancery Court determined that “individuals who act in a dual
capacity as directors of two corporations, one of whom is parent and the
other subsidiary, owe the same duty of good management to both
corporations. This duty is to be exercised in light of what is best for both
corporations.”154 The Warshaw court further decided that multiple
directorships, while permissible, are no excuse for not serving each
corporation equally in performing the duty of “good management.”155 In
absolving the defendants of personal liability, the court relied on the
business judgment rule and the presumption that directors act in the best
interests of the corporations that they serve, even if financial harm comes
to a subsidiary corporation or its shareholders.156 The court relied in part
on the assumption that the circumstances giving rise to the minority
shareholder’s action were singular and unlikely to be repeated.157
Healthcare entities, specifically vertically and horizontally
integrated entities, are likely to experience the same conflicts recurrently.
As was discussed by example above, an HMO will have the statutorily
mandated mission to manage healthcare costs and to keep premiums as
low as possible, and a hospital will be charged with the statutory mission
of institutional care of humans. Neither mission will be altered absent
statutory modification by state legislature. Thus, the directors who sit on
overlapping boards of two such healthcare entities will be constantly
faced with conflicting licensure missions. Also, for-profit subsidiaries of
nonprofit organizations will face similar problems to the nonprofit;

corporations having overlapping directors and officers were characterized automatically
as “constructively fraudulent” if no shareholder ratification occurred. See Marciano v.
Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 403 (Del. 1987).
153
See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 362 (Del. 1993).
154
Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A. 2d 487, 492 (Del. Ch. 1966) (citing Abelow v.
Midstates Oil Corp., 189 A.2d 675 (Del. 1963); see also Levien v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 261
A.2d 911, 915 (Del. Ch. 1969), rev’d on other grounds, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971), on
remand to 300 A.2d 28 (Del. Ch. 1972), and on remand to 314 A.2d 216 (Del. Ch. 1973),
jmt. aff’d by 332 A.2d 139 (Del. 1975) (stating that multiple directorships are not an
excuse for diluting fiduciary duties owed to each corporation; such would be a “turnabout
under [Delaware] law.” Id. at 915.).
155
See Warshaw, 221 A.2d at 487.
156
Id. at 492-93.
157
Id. The suing minority shareholder was dissatisfied that her investment had
not generated a significant return, and she pointed to the corporate parent-subsidiary
relationship as evidence of wrongdoing. As the court stated, “plaintiff’s [sic] case …
rests entirely upon the proposition that there is something inherently wrong in permitting
Securities to retain its personal holding company status to the financial loss of its
stockholders.” Id. at 494. The particular decision at issue was the decision of the parent
holding company not to acquire additional shares of the stock of its subsidiary upon
issuance of new shares. The issuance of new shares was, in the history of the companies,
a singular action. Id. at 490-93.
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affiliation of nonprofit healthcare entities creates complications whether
the affiliation is nonprofit to nonprofit or nonprofit to for-profit.
Healthcare nonprofits have no shareholders to oversee their
activities; instead they serve a given community through fulfilling their
licensure and charter mission, the sine qua non of their existence.
Constant recusal ultimately would mean a failure of overlapping
directors to serve the community; also, recusal would become a farce.
Certain directors (or all directors, in the instance of mirror boards) would
never be able to vote and would ultimately violate the duty of care in the
process of attempting to honor the duty of loyalty. A fresh approach is
needed for healthcare nonprofits with overlapping boards.
IV. Proposals for Proactive Boards
It is important for directors to be able to proactively resolve
conflicts, but the need for clear guidance for overlapping boards goes
beyond the avoidance of government interference. Intervention by an
attorney general does nothing to advance norms in board behavior, the
same problem that has been experienced in caselaw.158 A preference for
models of proactive self-regulation and for more global (rather than
situational) approaches to governance and management has emerged in
the healthcare industry.159 As a procedural and economic matter, self158
See Fishman, supra note 8, at 250 (observing that boards tend to settle when
an attorney general brings an action against a charity, which contributes to the dearth of
guidance for board behavior).
159
An example of this trend for the healthcare industry is the model corporate
compliance guidances issued by the Department of Health and Human Services Office of
the Inspector General (the “OIG”). See Department of Health and Human Services
Office of the Inspector General Compliance Program Guidances for the healthcare
industry, available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/complianceguidance.html. Sarbanes-Oxley
appears to contribute to this trend as well. See Board Source & Independent Sector, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Implications for Nonprofit Organizations (Jan. 2006),
http://www.boardsource.org/clientfiles/Sarbanes-Oxley.pdf (noting that nonprofits are not
directly governed by Sarbanes-Oxley but that the legislation does set benchmarks that are
useful for the nonprofit sector). Boards of directors are instructed to lead the march
toward program integrity, which requires high levels of ethical behavior set by example
at the top of every healthcare organization. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. OF THE U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE: A RESOURCE FOR HEALTH CARE BOARDS OF DIRECTORS 1, available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/complianceguidance/040203CorpRespRsceGuide.pdf. The
OIG now interprets the duty of care to include an understanding of a healthcare entity’s
systems and the compliance program that is employed by the entity. See id. at 1. The
OIG, in conjunction with the American Health Lawyers Association, created this
document, in which they wrote: “Embedded within the duty of care is the concept of
reasonable inquiry. In other words, directors should make inquiries to management to
obtain information necessary to satisfy their duty of care.” Id. Citing In re Caremark
International, Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del Ch. 1996) (which involved a
shareholder derivative suit for breach of the duty of care when directors approved
kickbacks for prescription practices), the guidance states that failure to “reasonably
oversee the organization’s compliance program” or acting as “mere passive recipients of
information” can lead to violation of fiduciary duties. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. OF THE
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE: A RESOURCE FOR HEALTH CARE BOARDS OF DIRECTORS 1-2, available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/complianceguidance/040203CorpRespRsceGuide.pdf.
Though the OIG acknowledges that directors are not charged with day-to-day oversight
of the organization (that is the role of management in any organization), it still instructs
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regulation has been shown to be more cost-effective and better business
for the corporation not only because efficiencies are created from
discovered internal problems, but also because litigation and government
intervention are extraordinarily costly, thereby harming the entity and the
community it serves.160 The expectation for high-level stewardship
indicates that the decision-making of board members faced with conflicts
must be better informed and carefully considered with an eye toward
primacy of the duty of obedience. Though volunteer board members
have been let off the hook for lack of training and for general ignorance
in the ways of the healthcare business world, governmental and
community expectations have been changing.161
Healthcare entities are different than other corporations and even
other nonprofits; Professor Hansmann has discussed the higher standard
of healthcare nonprofits in terms of inequality of information that leads
to an imbalance between the patient and the healthcare provider.162
Many regulators and consumers have been disturbed by the rise of forprofit entities in healthcare precisely because healthcare is expected to be
exceptional (and should not be motivated by profit).163 But the confusion
surrounding duties goes beyond these concerns, as conflicts can arise
from information and from efforts at control. Because directors are often
chosen for their ties in the community, and sometimes because they sit
on the boards of other key businesses, “interested” transactions are not at
all unusual and, perhaps in certain instances, can be beneficial.164
A. Procedural Shifts
This article suggests that several procedural changes are
necessary to facilitate responsible overlapping boards. First, duality or
multiplicity of interests must be recognized and revealed at the outset of
board service; directors should perform a kind of due diligence upon
directors that their obligations extend to the oversight of compliance programs. See id. at
2-3.
160
See OIG Draft Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals,
69 Fed. Reg. 32012 (2004). The OIG observes:
Compliance programs help hospitals fulfill their legal duty to refrain from
submitting false or inaccurate claims or cost information to the Federal health
care programs or engaging in other illegal practices. A hospital may gain
important additional benefits by voluntarily implementing a compliance
program, including: Demonstrating the hospital’s commitment to honest and
responsible corporate conduct; [increasing the likelihood of preventing,
identifying, and correcting unlawful and unethical behavior at an early stage;
[encouraging employees to report potential problems to allow for appropriate
internal inquiry and corrective action; and through early detection and
reporting, minimizing any financial loss to government and taxpayers, as well
as any corresponding financial loss to the hospital.
Id. at 32013.
161
See id. at 2 (noting that courts often apply the business judgment rule).
162
See Hansmann, supra note 68, at 844-45 (stating that nonprofit ‘enterprises’
meet the need created by a market failure that arises from beneficiaries’ inability to police
certain producers of items or services, dubbed “contract failure”).
163
See BRADFORD H. GRAY, THE PROFIT MOTIVE AND PATIENT CARE: THE
CHANGING ACCOUNTABILITY OF DOCTORS AND HOSPITALS 7 (1991).
164
See Fishman, supra note 8, at 236 (writing that interested transactions are
“often a necessity” for nonprofit corporations).
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being asked to serve and document any actual or potential conflicts of
interest. Second, nonprofit corporations should have more intelligible
articles of incorporation and bylaws so that directors (and their
communities) better understand the mission of the organization.165
Third, though due diligence and proper documentation could lead to
mitigation upon occurrence of a deviant event, the appropriate state
agency should at least share oversight with the state attorney general to
help inform the prosecution, which generally is not versed in the
intricacies of healthcare. Fourth, the RMNCA should be modernized to
catalyze a progression in nonprofit statutory law that would aid this
doctrinal evolution.
1. Multiplicity of Interest – Documentation and Disclosure
The first procedural step requires recognition of the import of
interests that are divided before they are conflicted, meaning a diversion
of interest that arises from sitting on two boards, whether or not a
traditional financial conflict of interest arises. This is a procedural issue
because it requires directors to revise and refine the level, depth, and
most importantly the timing of disclosures of divisions of interest. It
requires substantive metamorphosis as well, but the end result is an
important change in procedure.
The idea of a duality, division, or multiplicity of interest serves
as a starting point. The AHA recognized the existence of a duality of
interest among board members in a series of management advisories that
have not been updated in over a decade (but that have been in circulation
since the 1970’s); but rarely has duality been recognized as an important
precursor to a conflict of interest.166 Duality, or division, of interest
indicates that a director of a healthcare organization may have
concomitant obligations that can benefit or burden the institution. This
duality is quite common for members of nonprofit boards of directors
who, as was discussed above, frequently sit on multiple boards.167
Historically, this multiplicity was seen as beneficial to corporations for
the potential connections, both in the community and economically, that

165
Better sense of mission does not necessarily mean that the mission is
constricted, only that it is clearer.
166
See American Hospital Association, AHA Management Advisory: Ethical
Conduct for Health Care Institutions (1992), available at
http://www.aha.org/aha/resource_center/resrouce/resource_ethics.html [hereinafter
Ethical Conduct]; American Hospital Association, AHA Management Advisory:
Resolution of Conflicts of Interest (1990) (on file with author) [hereinafter Resolution];
American Hospital Association, Guidelines: Resolution of Conflicts of Interest in Health
Care Institutions (1975) (on file with author) [hereinafter Guidelines]. For a brief
discussion of the problems healthcare institutions face due to dualities of interest (and
one of the only discussions), see L. Edward Bryant, Jr., Responsibilities of Directors of
Not-For-Profit Corporations Faced with Sharing Control with other Nonprofit
Organizations in Health Industry Affiliations: A Commentary on Legal and Practical
Realities, 7 ANNALS HEALTH L. 139 (1998).
167
See Resolution, supra note 166, at 1 (introducing the idea that healthcare
entities’ administrators often have outside interests that affect and can be affected by the
decisions of a particular institution).
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could be made.168 Today, with increased integration of healthcare
entities and continued perceived benefit from multiple board
memberships, accepting the dual nature of multiple memberships allows
the context in which conflicts later arise to be more informed.
Division allows for “divided loyalties” and does not implicate
monetary issues per se; it expands the scope of self-examination and selfdisclosure that must occur in order to properly serve multiple boards. If
such dualities are recognized, then a director would consider competing
interests and divulge information regarding her division of interests
earlier. The division or duality of interest that exists should be
immediately apparent upon appointment to a new board, and the director
should document the circumstances that give rise to the division as well
as the reasons by which the director concludes that service of multiple
boards is acceptable. Directors are already charged with a certain level
of sophistication if they serve healthcare entities in these times of heavy
fraud enforcement.169
Directors should not be held to more than a ‘reasonableness’
standard in performing this evaluation, much like the business judgment
rule.170 Unlike the business judgment rule, immunity is not being
proposed here, but the reasonableness standard is doctrinally familiar and
useful here. Best practices would call for the corporation to keep a
record of the director’s due diligence; each director could be required to
list all boards on which they serve as a condition of board membership to
facilitate the information sharing and keeping.
Even with disclosure occurring earlier, directors need a compass
for making decisions. That compass could be, at least in part, effectively
drafted articles of incorporation and bylaws.
2.

Charter Documentation

Insufficient charter documents contradict the stricter
requirements non-profit corporations face regarding their creation and
dissolution compared to other organizations.171 To enable directors to
perform initial due diligence, healthcare nonprofit organizations should
have well-crafted articles of incorporation and bylaws.172 If the articles
168

See Goldschmid, supra note 69, at 647-48 (noting that Professor
Hansmann’s suggestion that all conflicted transactions be banned for nonprofit
corporations is impractical because interested transactions can be “useful” and directors
with connections in other organizations can be the most useful for nonprofits) (citing
James J. Fishman & Stephen Schwarz, CASES AND MATERIALS ON NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS, 58-69 (1995)).
169
See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
170
See GUIDEBOOK, supra note 71, at 28-29. As the Guidebook states, “A
director exercising good-faith judgment will usually be protected from liability to the
corporation or to its membership under the Business Judgment Rule.” Id. at 28. As
Daniel Kurtz puts it, nonprofit directors must act in a manner that is “plausibly rational.”
Kurtz, supra note 66, at 49. ‘Plausible rationality’ seems a fair standard here as well.
171
See Fishman, supra note 8, at 226 (noting that nonprofit corporations are the
favored form for charities to take because, compared to unincorporated associations and
charitable trusts, nonprofit corporations have greater flexibility in governance, though
they must deal with greater formalities in their creation and dissolution).
172
The articles of incorporation are the original documentation from the state
that create the corporation and set forth the purposes for which it is formed. The bylaws
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of incorporation and bylaws clearly set forth the mission of the
organization, board members will be positively affected in at least two
ways. First, directors would be able to make a preliminary determination
as to whether they can serve multiple healthcare entities. Second, it
would assist in the issue of nonprofits’ accountability, which has long
been seen as a shortcoming of the nonprofit sector because of the
nebulousness of fiduciary duties and because of the lack of oversight (a
diminished issue if the directors follow through on the suggestions
herein).173
The preliminary determination as to whether multiple entities
can be served with fealty to charter mission and licensure mission can be
achieved if a nonprofit’s charter documents facilitate the decisionmaking process of directors. Without clear statements about the
purposes for which the organization was formed, the community that it
serves, and the manner in which directors are to make potentially
conflicted decisions, directors cannot be expected to understand the
potential danger (or utility) of sitting on multiple boards. States should
require more than just a recitation of the pertinent statutory nonprofit
formation purposes. If the statutory requirement were to require, for
instance, a reflection of the licensure requirements for the entity, then the
articles of incorporation might aid the directors in understanding and
carrying out their organization’s mission (and the state in enforcing the
mission).174
3.

No Safe Harbor

It might appear that this article, in proposing a procedure of due
diligence and documentation, is suggesting that directors who perform
such acts would be protected absolutely from investigation, prosecution,
or other governmental oversight; however, no safe harbor is
recommended. The division documentation could be a mitigating factor
should the government investigate an organization, but it would not be an
absolute shield. Due diligence serves other purposes, though; it enables
investigating agencies to infer that a nonprofit’s directors intended to
are functionally a code of conduct for the corporation that set forth the management and
rules for the organization.
173
See Reiser, supra note 15, at 210-18 (dividing nonprofits’ accountability
into three categories, financial accountability, mission accountability, and organizational
accountability in order to identify ways to address the long-standing concerns about the
nonprofit sector and its apparent lack of oversight and accountability to the public).
174
The mission language in the charter could be affected by amendments to the
enabling licensure statute; however, licensure statutes tend not to change the purpose or
nature of the healthcare provider being regulated. Instead, licensure statutes generally are
amended to add conditions of licensure such as reporting requirements or patient
information requirements. If the statutory licensure mission of the provider is not altered,
then charter documents would not be affected. Of course, hospital licensure statutes (and
other healthcare licensure statutes) can vary vastly from state to state. See John D. Blum,
Beyond the Bylaws: Hospital-Physician Relationships, Economics, and Conflicting
Agendas, 53 Buff. L. Rev. 459, 461 & fn. 4 (2005) (using the examples of Delaware,
Hawaii, and Illinois hospital licensure statutes to display the variance within this category
of state statutory law).

36

take their governance role seriously, and it enables government
investigators to better understand the mission of the organization.175
The question becomes which governmental agencies would best
oversee the activities of healthcare nonprofits. Attorneys general
traditionally have the power to investigate the activities of nonprofits as
protectors of the communities served by nonprofits, but they are not
necessarily expert in the legal issues faced by nonprofits or the
healthcare industry.176 Also, some scholars have questioned exactly
whom the state attorney general is representing in actions taken against
nonprofits; oftentimes the AG’s focus on financial issues excludes the
notion of fidelity to mission.177 Recent attorney general actions do not
necessarily protect the community intended to be served by healthcare
nonprofits; also, some unnecessary meddling in governance affairs postaction has become controversial.178 For instance, Attorney General
Hatch named eight members to Medica’s board of directors once the split
between Allina and Medica occurred; the board members subsequently
petitioned the court to terminate their settlement with Hatch, charging
too much interference in corporate affairs.179 Attorney General Hatch
undoubtedly had a difficult task in unwinding the underdeveloped and
abandoned law in Minnesota regarding integrated service networks so
that the development of Allina could be understood separately from the
shortcomings of the state’s failed legislative effort.180 Undoubtedly
conflicts of interest existed at Allina, but perhaps the attorney general’s
findings could have been clarified, and thus more informative for
directors of other integrated healthcare entities, if the expertise of the
relevant regulating agencies had been utilized. Drawing on the ongoing
example of Allina and its continued fallout, it appears that other state
agencies would help to round out the oversight of healthcare entities and
their boards.181
175
See Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State
Charity Law Enforcement, 79 INDIANA L.J. 937, 975 (2004) (taking issue with the recent
actions of attorney generals in the nonprofit sector, particularly with regard to their lack
of understanding concerning the nature of nonprofits).
176
See id. at 976-77, stating that “state attorneys general have no necessary
expertise, much less the resources, to address the myriad concerns of the hundreds of
thousands of charities that function in the United States today.”
177
See Reiser, supra note 15, at 234-35 (asserting that attorneys general are
overly concerned with financial issues to the detriment of mission fidelity and corporate
accountability).
178
See Brody, supra note 175, at 1007.
179
See id. An editorial in the Star Tribune “noted the unease of some observers
when the attorney general proposed to install his own board: ‘Some said it would give on
elected official too much power over the health care of 1 million Minnesota consumers;
other said it would be a conflict of interest for the state’s top consumer watchdog to
supervise a company run by his own appointees. … If Hatch appointed competent and
honorable people, then a judge should ask why the attorney general continues to secondguess their judgment. If Hatch appointed directors who are bungling the job, then a judge
should ask why the attorney general should be allowed to repeat the experiment.’” Id. at
1007-08 (citing Editorial, Hatch vs. Medica; Attorney General Should Let It Be, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), May 10, 2003, at A22). Additional anecdotes are well
described by Brody. See id. at 984-1018.
180
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
181
See Neal Gendler, Judge Ends Medica Suit by Hatch, STAR TRIBUNE, Aug.
19, 2005, available at http://www.startribune.com/stories/462/5568118.html.
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To the extent it is apposite in a given state, the department of
treasury, the department of health, and the department of insurance
should be included as expert investigators and enforcers for healthcare
nonprofits.182 The department of treasury is the entity that generally
registers corporations; the department of health generally is the entity
that licenses healthcare organizations to provide services to the
community; and the department of insurance is the entity that licenses
managed care entities and other health insurers. The mechanism of
oversight is simple: licensure. The licensure process creates proficiency
in healthcare that would help to address one of the most frequent
complaints about non-profits, that they are unaccountable to any
shareholder or other overseeing interested party.183 In healthcare, the
regulating agencies could be considered interested parties. Though they
may lack expertise specific to the corporate sphere, regulating agencies
have knowledge that could help eliminate the awkward assumptions of
attorneys general and help reduce the interference of the cy pres-like
machinations that have been witnessed recently.184 Some have suggested
that special commissions could be formed to help with oversight of
nonprofits, but improvements in the functioning of healthcare nonprofits,
whether or not they have overlapping boards, would not necessarily be
enhanced by an extra layer of non-expert oversight.185
4.

Revise the RMNCA

The original Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (“Model Act”)
was created in 1954 and was the result of a joint effort between the ABA
and the American Law Institute. Upon completion, the majority of states
adopted it.186 The RMNCA remains the primary model for states’
nonprofit corporation statutes.187

182

Attendance to state-oriented issues becomes particularly sticky if the
healthcare entity spans multiple states. As became apparent in Health Midwest v. Kline,
No. 02-CV-08043, 2003 WL 328845, at * 16-17 (D. Kan. Feb. 6, 2003), attempting to
adhere to state regulations across borders can be a significant challenge. See Greaney &
Boozang, supra note 15, at 27-30, describing the “border war” that arose between
Missouri and Kansas; see also Brody, supra note 15, at 1008-17 (describing the Health
Midwest pleadings).
183
See Robert A. Katz, Let Charitable Directors Direct: Why Trust Law Should
Not Curb Board Discretion Over a Charitable Corporation’s Mission and Unrestricted
Assets, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 689, 689-93 (2005) (describing failure of accountability to
introduce the idea that agency theory may be better suited to nonprofit corporations than
trust theory or corporate theory).
184
See Brody, supra note 175, at 957 (describing the ability of courts to modify
charitable trusts when their purposes have become impossible to carry out under the cy
pres doctrine).
185
See Fishman, supra note 8, at 222 (recommending the creation of publicprivate charity commissions to improve the problem of accountability for charitable
organizations in general and with no particular focus on the unique issues faced by
healthcare entities).
186
See Henry Hansmann, The Evolving Law of Nonprofit Organizations: Do
Current Trends Make Good Policy?, 39 CASE W. RES. 807, 810-11 (1989) (discussing
the ‘organizational’ history of nonprofit corporations in the context of then-current legal
trends).
187
See id. at 810.
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One of the major deficiencies of the Model Act, and thus the
RMNCA too, is that the drafters of the Model Act adopted the Model
Business Corporation Act virtually wholesale (with the exclusion of
provisions that clearly could not apply to nonprofit corporations, such as
stockholders rights).188 As has been stated here already and observed by
others in the past, the drafters did not include guidance on fiduciary
duties in the Model Act.189 While this deficiency was partially rectified
by the inclusion of a description of conflicts of interest for nonprofit
directors in the RMNCA,190 the extant model policy on conflicts of
interest is not sufficient for modern healthcare organizations.
The RMNCA is ripe for another reconfiguration, one that
encourages coherence in understanding the fiduciary duties of nonprofit
directors. While many scholars have espoused the notion of the duty of
obedience, courts have yet to adopt the doctrine with any consistency or
vigor.191 Because so many states follow the RMNCA, a new revision
could influence states’ recognition of the importance of the duty of
obedience, particularly in parsing the duties of directors who serve
multiple boards. Also, the RMNCA must be modified to recognize that
directors do often serve multiple boards and attempt to assist in the
multiplicity of interest conundrum.
Revising the RMNCA to
substantively address the doctrine of fiduciary duties could help to move
past the disparate attempts to reconcile traditional duties with modern
board structures.
B. Substantive Shifts
If the fact of overlapping board membership is accepted as a
starting point, then the question that must be asked (and that has never
been answered) is not just whether a director can be fair to both (or
many) entities, but also how. Directors need efficient and ethical means
to serve more than one board of directors, which also indicates that
potential conflicts should be addressed before they arise. This may
signify that directors determine that some conflicts are acceptable
because licensure missions align; or, this may indicate that directors
cannot serve multiple healthcare organizations’ boards, particularly in
situations involving a form of vertical integration.
Substantively, the law should be modified to recognize the
possible range of conflicts, not just the traditional and limited idea of
financial conflicts of interest, and that sometimes the traditional conflicts
188
See id. at 814 (describing the Model Act as unstable for lack of any clear
theory or vision of the nonprofit as a separate creature from the for-profit corporation).
189
See Hansmann, supra note 186, at 814, stating that the Model Act was
“muddled concerning permissible purposes for incorporation, vague and excessively
permissive about distributions of net assets to members on dissolution, and completely
silent about the critical issue of directors’ and officers’ fiduciary obligations.”
190
The RMNCA is based in part on the California nonprofit corporation statute,
which divides nonprofits into three categories and was the source of some bemusement
by nonprofit scholars. See Hansmann, supra note 186, at 816-819 (deriding the three
category approach to nonprofit statutes as “poorly conceived to meet the needs of the
nonprofit sector and its patrons.”) (citing Cal. Corp. Code §§ 5000-10841 (West. Supp.
1988)).
191
See supra section II.B.
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should not be a cause for concern in modern healthcare.192 First, the duty
of obedience should be recognized as the third leg in a tripod of fiduciary
duties for healthcare nonprofits. An additional needed development in
the doctrine of the duty of obedience is to bifurcate it into charter
mission and licensure mission. This would inspire discussion of conflict
or congruence of mission rather than limiting dualities of interest to
being interpreted as conflicts of financial interest. Second, the duty of
obedience facilitates the interpretation and understanding of the duty of
loyalty such that a director should know whether she could act in the best
interests of more than one corporation. Third, the duty of care can be
informed by the duty of obedience and the duty of loyalty, so that
directors recognize that having information that is necessary for fulfilling
the duty of care may mean violating the duty of loyalty or the duty of
mission and could make service of multiple boards untenable in certain
situations.
1. Elevating and Parsing the Duty of Obedience: Charter Mission and
Licensure Mission
The duty of obedience, or more appropriately, the duty of
mission, may be the best conduit to revising norms.193 The “duty to
ensure that the charitable mission of the corporation is carried out”194
should no longer be a subsidiary piece of the duty of care analysis. The
duty of obedience is a crucial aspect of the doctrine of fiduciary duties
for healthcare nonprofits (and perhaps healthcare for-profits). The extant
definition of the duty of obedience, which requires adherence to the
mission of the organization and faithfulness to the laws applicable to the
organization, is too nebulous to be doctrinally sound. At least with
regard to healthcare nonprofits, the notion of fidelity to mission should
be comprised of two elements: adherence to charter mission and
adherence to licensure mission.
Charter mission would be established in the stated objectives of
the corporation that render it eligible for nonprofit status. Thus, the
charter mission is dictated in part by the requirements of the nonprofit
statute of the home charter state and in part by the language in
documents like the articles of incorporation and bylaws of an
organization (which should be drafted according to the new procedures
set forth above). It was the charter mission, set forth in the certificate of
incorporation, that the court in MEETH relied on in determining that the
sale of MEETH’s property and establishment of community clinics was
not true to the mission of being a “hospital in the City, County, and State
of New York.”195 Charter mission is limited by the purposes for which a
nonprofit corporation can be formed in the state of incorporation; thus,
the charter mission of a subsidiary could not be written (manipulated) to
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See Reiser, supra note 15, at 234 (discussing “activist AGs” tendency to
focus on financial issues).
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As has been stated by Professor Hansmann, the “principal function of the
nonprofit form” is to “serve effectively as fiduciaries for their patrons.” Hansmann,
supra note 186, at 819.
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MEETH v. Spitzer, 186 Misc.2d 126, 152 (1999).
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Id. at 128.
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serve a system or a parent corporation, because those are not accepted
reasons for forming nonprofit corporations.
Licensure mission would invoke the state’s statutory vision of
the healthcare entity’s social role to determine if the entity is behaving in
a way that is true to its delineated healthcare function. The activities of
healthcare nonprofits are therefore governed, constrained, and defined by
both their charter mission and the licensure mission as set forth by the
states in which the entity provides healthcare services. To require
nonprofit healthcare organizations to only adhere to their charter mission
is to look at the picture with one eye. Licensure is pivotal in determining
the nature and purpose of a healthcare entity. Depending on state
requirements, it can even make a for-profit behave like a nonprofit.196
Thus, whether or not a healthcare nonprofit drafts its documents to
reflect both corporate and licensure requirements for the type of services
provided, directors must understand that their duty of obedience is
comprised specifically of the two elements of charter mission and
licensure mission. The last aspect of the duty of obedience, adherence to
applicable laws, is not essential to the analysis; it evokes the duty of care,
which would be violated if directors were to ignore all laws that apply to
a given entity. Perhaps this vague and overly broad element of the duty
of obedience has stood in the way of the principle being fully accepted.
Regardless, the duty of obedience can now be described as adherence to
charter mission and licensure mission, which can then help with
interpretation of the duty of loyalty.
2. Duty of Loyalty Viewed through Duty of Obedience
The baseline for the duty of loyalty informed by duty of
obedience is that multiple directorships are common, though they can be
vexatious.197 Thus, the predicate goal is not to eliminate overlap, but to
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For an example of such legislation, see N.J. Stat. 26:2H-18.51 (2005), which
requires all general hospitals to provide charity care services and provides subsidies to
the hospitals that bear the charity care burden the most through a state fund. The
legislative history notes the policy goals of the state:
Access to quality health care shall not be denied to residents of this State
because of their inability to pay for the care; there are many residents of this
State who cannot afford to pay for needed hospital care and in order to ensure
that these persons have equal access to hospital care, it is necessary to provide
disproportionate share hospitals with a charity care subsidy supported by a
broad-based funding mechanism.
Id.
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Louis Brandeis disagreed with this premise, though his comments about
overlapping directorates were famously (or infamously) made in the context of the
dominance of the banking industry in the early 1900s, which Brandeis dubbed the
“Money Trust.” See generally LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY (1914).
The passing and context of time help to dispel the unease that comes from his statement:
“The practice of interlocking directorates is the root of many evils. It offends laws both
human and divine. Applied to rival corporations, it tends to the suppression of
competition and to violation of the Sherman law. Applied to corporations that deal with
each other, it tends to disloyalty and to violation of the fundamental law that no man can
serve two masters.” Id. at 51. Brandeis continued:
But the compelling reason for prohibiting interlocking directorates is neither
the protection of stockholders, nor the protection of the public from the
incidents of inefficiency and graft. Conclusive evidence (if obtainable) that the
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decide when it is appropriate and how directors can work through
multiplicities of interest based upon their understanding of the mission of
each organization and the healthcare system with which the organization
may be affiliated. The duty of loyalty analysis for nonprofits still bears
the marks of its origins in for-profit corporate law. But, considering only
financial interests when evaluating conflicts is limiting and insufficient
for healthcare nonprofits. The overarching concept of the duty of loyalty
– acting in the best interests of the corporation at all times – is
informative, but impracticable when serving multiple healthcare
organizations.198 If the assessment of conflicts is expanded to include an
evaluation of conflicting missions, however, then the duty of loyalty can
be a more meaningful, proactive, and global doctrine.
Directors should determine whether they could properly act in
the best interests of an organization by drawing upon the charter and
licensure mission of each organization. As Attorney General Hatch
correctly noted in the Allina investigation, the missions of HMOs and
hospitals may always conflict.199 A director being asked by an HMO to
keep the costs of care down, and being asked by hospitals to increase
reimbursement to provide more and better in-patient care services, may
find that she is constantly at odds with herself and unable to wear both
directorial hats for a vertically integrated healthcare system. Only by
understanding the dual nature of the healthcare entity’s mission can a
director make a meaningful decision about her duty of loyalty to each
organization. Alternatives to limiting board memberships may need to
be found, for instance, by allowing for non-voting board members, or by
including ex-officio members without voting rights, or by balancing
board membership so that the original entity cannot be out-voted by
allied entities.
3. Duty of Care Informed by the Other Two Fiduciary Duties
The duty of care is not necessarily violated by serving multiple
boards so long as attention is paid to each board. This is more a
practical, temporal matter than a legal matter; and, the duty of care is the
least problematic duty in board overlap, unless a director is too busy with
other boards to properly monitor organizational activities. Recall that the
duty of care is a measure of a director’s attention to a particular entity for
which she sits on a board; in order to fulfill the duty of care, the director
must act in a reasonably informed manner. The idea that directors
should adhere to the laws applicable to the organization belongs here, not
practice of interlocking directorates benefited all stockholders and was the most
efficient form of organization, would not remove the objections. For even
more important than efficiency are industrial and political liberty; and these are
imperiled by the Money Trust.
Id. at 62.
Efficiency is indeed one of the dominant reasons that overlapping boards occur in
healthcare, making it more difficult to dismiss the need for efficiency for the benefit of
“liberty” as Brandeis advocated.
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See COMPLIANCE REVIEW, supra note 30, § 2.5 at 9.
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under the duty of obedience. If a director has performed the appropriate
due diligence and has determined that the duty of obedience and the duty
of loyalty can be served, then the duty of care will likely fall in line. It is
thus the last priority in resolving multiplicities of interest.
C. Reevaluating Multiple Board Memberships
To fulfill its ethical duties, a board must not only keep corporate
and charitable purposes in sight, it must also consider the public’s
viewpoint and assure the healthcare consumer that decisions have been
made in an ethically sound and effective manner. With an ethical lens
placed over the new perception of fiduciary duties described above, it
becomes clear that directors may need to limit the number of boards on
which they serve, particularly if the entities have conflicting charter or
licensure missions; but, the community and/or healthcare consumer may
be better served by directors sitting on multiple boards. Revisiting the
three examples helps to focus the implications of revising fiduciary
duties for healthcare nonprofits.
1.

Vertically Integrated Systems

The break-up of Allina Health System has served as a warning to
many in the healthcare industry about sloppy alliances and the import of
attention to mission, but the industry might have learned more if the
Compliance Review had included an analysis of Allina’s corporate
structure, which separated the hospital and health insurance divisions
into independent nonprofit corporations with overlapping boards of
directors for control purposes. “Obvious” conflicts of interest arose
between the mission of Medica as a health maintenance organization and
the mission of the Allina Health System, conflicts that appeared to
deprive the Medica directors of the ability to consider the best interests
of the HMO’s enrollees.200 Any action taken by the board of either entity
contrary to the mission of the entity would therefore be a conflict of
interest and potentially impermissible as a breach of the duty of loyalty
and the duty of obedience.201
Hatch hit a fountainhead of potential exposition: when finance
and service are combined, can directors ever be faithful to their fiduciary
duties for each organization? It could be difficult. Applying the
bifurcated duty of obedience informing duty of loyalty analysis in
combination with procedural improvements advocated above, it seems
that directors would have to recognize from the inception of their
services that the financial entity and the service entity in a vertically
integrated delivery system will have conflicting missions. Unless the
entity were truly integrated into a staff-model HMO, the licensure
mission of each entity will have inherent tensions that will not be
200

See COMPLIANCE REVIEW, supra note 30, § 2.21 at 33.
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resolved by ‘inform and recuse.’ The directors of the HMO would
always be attempting to serve their charter and licensure mission of
creating economic efficiencies. The directors of the hospital (or hospital
system) would serve their charter and licensure missions by seeking to
increase and improve the institutional care of human beings.
The directors who serve both entities could reasonably conclude,
before sitting through even one board meeting, that they would encounter
conflicts of mission at every turn. Had the Allina directors performed
this analysis, they could have avoided a good amount of the scrutiny they
faced. If they had decided that board overlap was appropriate after
performing the due diligence on their charter and licensure missions,
then each fund-shift between entities would have been analyzed too with
an eye toward the licensure mission conflict they were facing in addition
to the duty of loyalty issues that were created. It would have been clear
that keeping Medica in the Medicare + Choice market in order to serve
the needs of Allina’s hospitals was not only a breach of the duty of
obedience, but also a breach of the duty of loyalty. The analysis would
be similar in any vertically integrated system, though not all are created
and run like Allina.
2.

Horizontally Integrated Systems

The clarifications that result from including the charter
mission/licensure mission bifurcation can be seen as well in the second
example, wherein a typical hospital system of multiple hospitals is
governed by one umbrella board of directors or by boards of directors
with overlapping members. The board members of the suburban
hospitals are potentially breaching their fiduciary duties to the individual
suburban hospitals simply by supporting Urban Hospital, but the public
fisc and the public health are served by maintaining Urban Hospital.
If the public benefits from the directors of a horizontally
integrated system supporting the member hospitals of the system, then
the directors should not be held accountable for breaching fiduciary
duties. If we apply the ‘obedience informing loyalty’ analysis, the
missions of the hospitals align from a licensure perspective. Each of the
institutional entities in a horizontally integrated system will have the goal
of (by example) the institutional care of human beings. Further, states
tend to impose similar requirements on institutional healthcare entities to
maintain their nonprofit status, such as the provision of charity care.
Thus, even though they are separately incorporated, the organizations
have virtually identical licensure missions. The ultimate simplifying
approach would be for the hospitals to merge, but mergers and
acquisitions can be tricky for regulatory reasons, such as the difficulty
involved in combining and obtaining Medicare provider numbers (the
major source of income for many hospitals) and in re-forming hospitals’
contractual relationships with other healthcare entities and providers.202
202
See Carl H. Hitchner, Clare Richardson, Judith E. Solomon & Charles B.
Oppenheim, Integrated Delivery Systems: A Survey of Organizational Models, 29 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 273, 284 (1994). The authors note the difficulties facing healthcare
entities seeking to fully integrate, stating that IDSs face “daunting legal obstacles. A
basic issue, for example, is the ability of an integrated delivery system itself to obtain its
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Also, licensure may restrain a hospital from composing itself as one
corporate entity with many facilities.203
Recognition of similar licensure missions creates a new
understanding of overlapping directors in horizontally integrated
systems. Instead of breaching their duty of obedience, they may instead
be enhancing it if they serve multiple entities in one system. In the
example of the urban/suburban system, the directors are not necessarily
violating the duty of obedience by creating centers of excellence or by
financially supporting the less stable Urban Hospital.204 The traditional
financially-focused analysis of the duty of loyalty would require the
directors to keep the money and to reinvest it in Hospital A and Hospital
B. But, if the duty of loyalty is informed by the duty of obedience, the
directors would not be breaching their duty of loyalty to shift money to
Urban Hospital to keep it afloat, as they share the same market and the
same patients, and all of them will potentially be stronger from a mission
perspective if Urban Hospital does not go bankrupt.
In instances where the duty of loyalty might once have been
violated, we see that the duty of obedience influences the understanding
of “conflict” to draw the focus to serving the community rather than
focusing on the current transaction’s financial impact. The global
approach is more satisfying for a healthcare nonprofit and helps directors
to perform their duties in a more proactive, comprehensive way. Also,
this interpretation of the fiduciary duties of nonprofit directors is
consistent with the desire to infuse nonprofit law with trust principles
that have often been peripherally informative but not comfortably
doctrinally infused into nonprofit directors’ fiduciary duties.
3.

Smaller Alliances

Hometown Hospital and HHA share board members in the last
example; the overlapping board does not exist to create an integrated
delivery system, and no formal contracts exist between the entities.
Nevertheless, the alliance is beneficial to both entities in terms of
relationship building and maintenance. In the small community, the
boards contain overlapping members because the community lacks
options and because overlap helps to keep business flowing. When HHA
own Medicare provider number and bill for all system services. Because integrated
delivery systems often are comprised of a number of separate legal entities, particularly
with respect to the physician component, single point billing would require assignment of
claims to the system's billing entity.” Id. at 284. The authors proceed to list serious
complications arising from Medicare reimbursement rules, and conclude by noting,
“Under these statutory and regulatory constraints, many integrated delivery systems find
it difficult to function effectively as integrated billing units for Medicare purposes.”
Id. at 285.
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See Thomas H. Brock, Minimizing antitrust exposure in a virtual merger –
tips for hospitals entering virtual mergers, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Sept. 1999,
available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3257/is_9_53/ai_55834426
(noting that hospitals “face difficulties in attempting to fully combine disparate systems
of governance, administration, and day-to-day operations” and other problems unique to
the highly regulated nature of hospitals and other healthcare entities).
204
On the other hand, if the urban patients cannot realistically reach the centers
of excellence when their services are required, then the directors on the board of Urban
Hospital have violated their duty of obedience with regard to Urban Hospital.

45

decides to serve Neighbor Hospital, board members who sit on both
boards may suffer from divided loyalties. One of the most difficult
issues that arises is whether the directors have a duty to inform
Hometown Hospital of the new branch of potentially competing
business. If the directors who sit on HHA’s board reveal the information
to Hometown Hospital’s board, then they will breach their duty of
loyalty to HHA; and if they do not reveal the information, they breach
their fiduciary duties to Hometown Hospital.
The bifurcated duty of obedience analysis will be influenced by
the community that the charter mission identifies as the one to be served
by each entity. If one entity serves a larger catchment area than the
other, then the charter mission may help the directors to determine
whether they need to reveal the potential line of new business. For
instance, if Hometown Hospital serves a smaller geographic area than
HHA, then HHA’s directors may decide that no conflict of mission exists
when the HHA starts to serve another local hospital that by virtue of the
HHA’s charter mission is properly served. The licensure missions of the
entities are likely complementary (patient service in an institution versus
patient service in the patient’s home).
Where the duty of obedience analysis only moderately assists in
analyzing the new business for HHA, the duty of loyalty helps to
determine whether the directors have a duty to reveal the information
they have to the Hometown Hospital board. In the example, we see the
limitations of the traditional interpretation of the duty of loyalty, as no
financial usurpation or opportunity actually exists; the hospital does not
have its own home health agency and would not be able to perform the
services that HHA is proposing to expand to Neighbor Hospital. Fears of
service loss, and perhaps a fear of competition, legitimately exist, but
that does not fit squarely within the traditional definition of conflict of
interest.205 Nevertheless, if information can be deemed a potential source
of conflict, viewing the informational tension of the directors through the
lens of serving the community, then the directors should inform the
board of Hometown Hospital of HHA’s plan to extend services and, in
subsequent vote regarding HHA, recuse themselves depending on the
context of the vote. Avoidance of breaching the duty of loyalty to HHA
is aided by considering the needs of the community as it is served by
both entities as viewed through their charter missions and licensure
missions.
IV. Conclusion
Overlapping boards of directors are a fixture in nonprofit
healthcare organizations, yet little guidance is available to their directors
or the agencies that regulate them. While overlapping boards can be
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beneficial, they can also lead organizations astray. The key for directors
is to determine whether they can and/or should serve multiple boards,
and what effect their multiplicity of interest will have on their role in the
governance of various organizations. A part of the solution is resolution
of the temporal problem – what “conflict” means and when it must be
considered – and must take into account many factors, including the
social function of nonprofit healthcare organizations, the suitability of
traditional corporate norms to the governance of those enterprises, and
the importance of mission to healthcare entities in serving a community.
It is unreasonable to expect directors to adhere to high ideals of fiduciary
responsibility when they have no guidance for such responsibility or the
means by which they can explore its contours.
To achieve this from a procedural perspective, multiplicity of
interests must be recognized and revealed at the outset of board service
by having directors perform due diligence upon being asked to serve on
any board and to document all actual or potential conflicts. Better
drafted articles of incorporation and bylaws would help directors to
understand and maintain the charter and licensure mission of the
organization.
To facilitate the state’s dealings with healthcare
nonprofits, the healthcare-specialized agencies should at least share
oversight with the state attorney general. Also, the RMNCA should be
revised to catalyze an evolution in nonprofit statutory law.
Additionally, from a substantive perspective, the possible range
of conflicts for nonprofit healthcare directors, not just the traditional and
limited idea of financial conflicts of interest, must be defined and
applied. The duty of obedience should be recognized as doctrinally
essential for defining fiduciary duties for healthcare nonprofits. The duty
of obedience should be bifurcated into charter mission and licensure
mission, which would allow a discussion of conflict of mission rather
than just conflicts of financial interest. The duty of obedience can then
enlighten the interpretation and understanding of the duty of loyalty such
that a director may know at the outset whether she could act in the best
interests of more than one corporation. Also, the duty of care can be
informed by the duty of obedience and the duty of loyalty, so that
directors recognize that information that is necessary to fulfill the duty of
care may lead to violating the duty of loyalty or the duty of obedience.
Each of these steps should aid directors serving overlapping boards to
avoid the “evils” that have been much discussed but little defined.
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